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Did backlash to judicial decisions play a destructive role in debates over same-sex
marriage, as was so often claimed? This Article questions assumptions about consensus
and constitutionalism that undergird claims about judicial backlash, and explores some
constructive functions of conflict in our constitutional order.
The debate over same-sex marriage illustrates that conflict, constrained by constitutional
culture, can forge meanings and bonds that strengthen the constitutional order.
Constitutional culture, on this account, includes the understandings about role that guide
interactions among citizens and officials who disagree about the Constitution's meaning.
Analyzing the long-running conflict over same-sex marriage with attention to these
role-based understandings leads us differently to evaluate the power and limits ofjudicial
review.
In this Article I argue that the backlash narrative and the consensus model of
constitutionalism on which it rests simultaneously underestimate and overestimate the
power ofjudicial review. The Court's decision in Obergefellwas possible not simply because
public opinion changed, but also because struggle over the courts helped change public
opinion and forge new constitutional understandings. Even so, Obergefell has not ended
debate over marriage, but instead has channeled it into new forms. Conflict of this kind
is enabled, and constrained, by the role-based understandings of constitutional culture.
A conclusion invokes anxieties attending the election of Donald Trump to illustrate how
critical the perpetually contested role constraints of constitutional culture are in sustaining
our constitutional order.
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INTRODUCTION
The process of debating, litigating and legislating in response to a con-
stitutional decision one thinks wrong has been an important part of
our legal tradition. It has been used by political liberals and political
conservatives alike ....
-Edwin Meese III'
We look to courts to protect minority rights yet often doubt the power of
courts to defy majority views. For many, it is constitutional common sense that
judges will provoke destructive forms of backlash if they do not interpret the U.S.
Constitution in accord with popular consensus. Beliefs of this kind, which
dominated the debate over same-sex marriage, call into question the
countermajoritarian possibilities ofjudicial review.
In this Article, I question the consensus-based account of constitutional
authority on which the backlash narrative rests, and explore the goods of consti-
tutional conflict in the debate over same-sex marriage, and beyond. Conflict is
not only or always destructive, as the backlash narrative suggests. As judges
handed down decisions recognizing same-sex marriage, Americans mobilized to
oppose and to defend the courts' judgments, and with the passage of time, this
very conflict changed the ways Americans understood the equities of the
marriage debate.
The debate over same-sex marriage illustrates that conflict, constrained by
constitutional culture, can forge meanings and bonds that strengthen the consti-
tutional order. Constitutional culture, on this account, includes the understandings
about role that guide interactions among citizens and officials who disagree about
the Constitution's meaning.? Analyzing the long-running conflict over same-sex
1. Edwin Meese Ell, The Tulane Speech: WhatlMeant, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1003 1006 (1987) (defending a
widely criticized speech in which Meese, Attorney General under President Ronald Reagan,
asserted that the executive branch was the U.S. Supreme Court's equal in interpreting the
Constitution).
2. See infra Part V. I first analyzed how the role-based understandings of constitutional culture
constrain and channel conflict in Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict
and Constitutional Change The Case ofthe De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). There I
observe:
[Clonstitutional culture supplies understandings of role and practices of argument
through which citizens and officials can propose new ways of enacting the society's
defining commitments-as well as resources to resist those proposals. Constitutional
culture preserves and perpetually destabilizes the distinction between politics and
law.... When constitutional culture can harness the energies of social conflict,
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marriage with attention to these role-based understandings leads us differently to
evaluate the power and limits of judicial review. As fundamentally, the analysis
focuses our attention on understandings of citizens and officials on which the
functioning of a constitutional democracy depends.
The backlash narrative is a familiar one. In the four decades before the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges,' the nation debated the constitu-
tional right of same-sex couples to marry and the role of courts in deciding this
question. When state courts recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry
under their state constitutions, opponents amended the constitutions to define
marriage as a union of man and a woman.' Critics argued that court decisions
shutting down democratic debate were counterproductive and provoked backlash
that exacerbated political polarization and inhibited the prospects of change.
Conversation about backlash ranged widely from academics and advocates to
judges.s These realist accounts of judicial review depicted courts as majoritarian
institutions whose authority is tied to public consensus.' On this view, the
Court's opinion in Obergfellwas possible only because public opinion changed.
In this Article I argue that the backlash narrative and the consensus-based
model of constitutionalism on which it rests simultaneously underestimate and
overestimate the power of judicial review. As I show, the Court's decision in
Obergefell was possible not simply because public opinion changed but also
because struggle over the courts helped change public opinion and forge new
constitutional understandings.' Even so, Obergefell has not ended debate over
marriage but instead has channeled it into new forms: Opponents of same-sex
marriage now assert rights of conscience and religious liberty to resist recognition
of same-sex relationships.' Dynamics that cleared the path to Obergefell are con-
agents of deeply agonistic views remain engaged in constitutional dispute, speaking
through the Constitution rather than against it.
Id at 1327. In a jointly authored work, Robert Post and I have employed the model of democratic
constitutionalism to examine "the potentially constructive effects of backlash." Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373,
375, 376 (2007) ("Democratic constitutionalism describes how our constitutional order actually
negotiates the tension between the rule of law and self-governance. It shows how constitutional
meaning bends to the insistence of popular beliefs and yet simultaneously retains integrity as law.").
3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra note 74 and accompanying text, which discusses op-eds by law professors advancing this
view.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015) (reviewing a wedding
cake shop owner's religiously-based refisal to provide services to same-sex couples), cert. granted sub
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tinuing in its wake. Conflict of this kind is enabled, and constrained, by the
role-based understandings of constitutional culture.
There are, of course, many conceptions and instantiations of constitutional
culture. I use the term to draw attention to popular and professional understandings
about law in the United States that structure the roles of citizens and officials in
making claims in conflicts over the Constitution's meaning. These understandings
about role, and the beliefs about institutional authority on which they rest help
citizens and officials decide whether they must defer to one another and when
and how they may contest each other's views. It is through these role-based
understandings that the constitutional order coordinates its commitments to
democracy and the rule of law."o Analyzing the work of courts through the lens
of constitutional culture suggests that courts have more and less power than the
consensus-based model of constitutionalism assumes. Furthermore, it suggests
that conflict can play a more constructive role in the legal system than the consensus-
based model of constitutionalism imagines.
The account of constitutional culture I offer sees a source of meaning and
community in role-constrained conflict. It is not only consent, but conflict,
constrained by the role understandings of constitutional culture, that sustains the
Constitution's authority in history. These role-based interactions help "steer[]"
constitutional development over time, and promote the "attachment" of those
who may be deeply estranged from official pronouncements of the law." The
conflict over marriage illustrates how these popular and professional understandings
about law can guide citizens and officials arguing over the Constitution in
elections, legislatures, and courts as they debate what it means to live in a consti-
tutional democracy committed to the rule of law. This account of constitutional
culture contributes to descriptive, interpretive, and prescriptive judgments about
the logic of our constitutional law.
In Part I, I begin with a brief sketch of the conflict over same-sex marriage
and suggest how criticism of courts causing backlash emerged in that setting. In
Part 11, 1 examine a premise of many who criticized courts for provoking backlash:
that courts' authority to interpret the Constitution is tied to popular consensus.
nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 16-111, 2017 WL 2722428
(U.S. June 26, 2017); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE LJ. 2516, 2542-65 (2015) (showing how,
through constitutional conflict, objections to contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage have
evolved into claims about religious liberties); infra text accompanying notes 142-54.
10. See infra Part V. In modeling the relation of law and politics, I draw on my prior work on social
movement conflict and constitutional culture as well as on my writing on democratic constitutionalism
with Robert Post. See supra note 2.
11. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1343, 1328.
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Part III argues that this consensus-based account of judicial authority misap-
prehends the conflict adjudication provokes in ways that both underestimates and
overestimates the power of courts. To illustrate, Part IV examines the goods
produced by conflict over the courts in the decades before Obergefell, showing
how the fight over the courts changed meanings and relationships within move-
ments, between movements, and in the public at large. In Part V, I focus attention
on the role-based understandings of constitutional culture that enable conflicts of
this kind--and suggest how the understandings that enabled conflict on the path
to Obergefell enable conflict to persist in Obergefells wake.
Once we recognize the role-based understandings that constrained and
channeled conflict over marriage, we can appreciate how these role-based
understandings sustain community through conflict in many arenas. A conclusion
invokes anxieties attending the election of Donald Trump to illustrate how critical
the perpetually contested role constraints of constitutional culture are in sustaining
our constitutional order.
I. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND BACKLASH
In 1972, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a same-sex marriage
claim.12 Four decades later, in 2015, the Court held that state laws defining
marriage as the union of man and a woman denied same-sex couples a right to
marry that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses.13 In what follows, I sketch the broad outlines of that
conflict as a field in which Americans debated the role of courts in enforcing
minority rights.
A. The Conflict Over Marriage, 1970-2015
In the four and a half decades between the Court's two marriage decisions, a
great debate raged over the constitutional protections afforded to gays and lesbians.
In 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in Bowers v. Hardwickl4 that the Constitution
allowed states to criminalize same-sex sex."s A decade later, without mention of
its decision in Bowers, the Court held that animus against homosexuals was not a
constitutionally sufficient reason for a state to restrict its ability to enact antidis-
12. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), (dismissing the appeal "for want of substantial federal
question"), dismissing appealfrom 191 N.W.2d 185 (Min. 1971).
13. Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,2604-05 (2015).
14. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15. Id at 196.
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crimination laws."6 In 2003, the Court reversed Bowers and ruled in Lawrence v.
Texas17 that laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy denied gays dignity, liberty, and
equality protected by the Due Process Clause." Reversal of Bowers signaled an
important shift. After Lawrence, courts began to rule that the exclusion of gays
from the military violated liberty and equality," ultimately prompting Congress
to repeal the ban in 2010."
The marriage debate unfolded in the midst of this tumult. In the 1990s,
courts began to scrutinize restrictions on the rights of same-sex couples to marry
under state constitutions, first in Hawaii and Alaska.2' But citizens mobilized
against these early state decisions. In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of
Marriage Act, which defined marriage for purposes of federal tax and benefits law
as a union of a man and a woman and allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex
unions solemnized in other states. 22 Soon after, citizens overturned the Hawaii
and Alaska decisions by amending their state constitutions to define marriage as a
relationship between a man and a woman.23
This pattern recurred. In 2003, months after the Supreme Court struck
down a law criminalizing same-sex sodomy in Lawrence, the Massachusetts's
highest court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Healt/.4 that denying
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the state constitution.25 Again,
Americans mobilized to block the spread of same-sex marriage. As other state
16. Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,636 (1996).
17. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
18. Id. at 579.
19. See, e.g., Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 815-19 (9th Cir. 2008); Log Cabin
Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal 2010), vacated, 658 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2011).
20. 10 U.S.C. § 654, repealedby Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124
Stat. 3515.
21. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super.
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-67 (Haw. 1993) (recognizing that a statute
restricting marriage to heterosexual unions was a sex-based classification and subjecting the
statute to strict scrutiny). In Hawaii, the statute that limited marriage to heterosexual unions was
not struck down until 1996, see Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 649235 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996), but the Hawaii Supreme Court's 1993 ruling that the statute was subject to strict
scrutiny generated the first wave ofbacklash. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-
Sex Marriage: Learning From Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1493, 1524 (2006); William N. Eskridge Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional
Litigation HasAdvanced Marriage Equality, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 284 (2013).
22. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
23. See ALASKA CONST. art I § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I § 23; William N. Eskridge Jr., Equality Practice:
Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REXV. 853, 874 (2001).
24. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
25. Id at 970.
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constitutional courts began to consider right to marry cases, citizens enacted a
wave of state constitutional amendments and referenda that prohibited marriage
between same-sex couples.26 A movement to ban same-sex marriage by amending
the United States Constitution drew conservatives to the polls in the 2004 presi-
dential election, with many attributing President Bush's margin of victory to the
marriage debate.27 In 2010, opponents of marriage led a successful campaign to
block the reelection of three Iowa Supreme Court justices who had joined that
court's unanimous decision to recognize same-sex marriage under the state's
constitution. "I think it will send a message across the country that the power
resides with the people," the campaign's leader urged. "It's we the people, not we
the courts."
B. Backlash and the Institutional Limitations of Courts
Amidst these developments, a growing number of commentators began to
argue that popular reaction to decisions recognizing the right of same-sex couples
to marry demonstrated the impotence of courts to vindicate minority rights.
Court decisions recognizing the right to marry prompted backlash, critics argued,
prompting attacks on the courts as had decisions striking down racial segregation,
the death penalty, or laws criminalizing abortion.29
According to the judicial backlash thesis, courts striking down popular
legislation to vindicate minority rights were not only ineffective, but counterpro-
26. E.g., MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; OR. CONST. art. xv § 51; see Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme
Court 2012 Term-Foreword Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 80 n.406 (2013)
("[C]onstitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage passed in twenty-three states from
2004 to 2006 alone.").
27. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 481-82 &
nn. 364-70(2005). But see KENNETH SHERRILL, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POL'Y
INST., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/statichtml/downloads/reports/reports/2004ElectionAndMarriage.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8GKD-M4MV] ("In the 2004 presidential election, 60% of voters said that
they supported same-sex marriage or civil unions.... [T]he notion that the issue of same-sex
marriage cost the election to the Democratic Party has been uncritically accepted as common
wisdom."); David Brooks, Opinion, The Values-Vote Myth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2004), http//
www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/opinion/the-valuesvote-myth.html [https://perma.cc/Y6AD-
CUMC] (challenging the view that "throngs of homophobic, Red America values-voters surged to
the polls to put George Bush over the top").
28. A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of lowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html [https://perma.cc/HC48-26Y6]
(quoting Bob Vander Plaats, an "unsuccessful Republican candidate for governor who led the
campaign").
29. For a comparison of same-sex marriage "backlash" to Brown and racial desegregation backlash, see
Klarman, supra note 27, at 473-82.
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ductive; judicial decisions "shutting down" politics30 could frustrate democratic
majorities in ways that would produce more virulent politics than might have
resulted had judges refused to intervene.
In a prominent article published in 2005, Professor Michael Klarman
compared responseto Goodridge, the Massachusetts marriage decision, to massive
resistance to Brown v. Board ofEducation.3 ' He asserted that "Court rulings such
as Brown and Goodridge produce political backlashes for three principal reasons:
They raise the salience of an issue, they incite anger over 'outside interference' or
'judicial activism,' and they alter the order in which social change would otherwise
have occurred."32 Romance about Brown notwithstanding, courts are poor
vehicles for social change, Klarman argued: "[Judicially mandated social reform
may mobilize greater resistance than change accomplished through legislatures or
with the acquiescence of other democratically operated institutions."" Loss
through litigation specially enraged citizens accustomed to self-government:
"[B]ecause [Goodridge] was a court decision, rather than a reform adopted byvoters
or popularly elected legislators, critics were able to deride it as the handiwork of
arrogant 'activist judges' defying the will of the people."34 In the short run at least,
Klarman emphasized, litigation can lead to perverse results: "By outpacing public
opinion on issues of social reform, such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut
moderates, and retard the cause they purport to advance."3 s
30. For an example of the judicial backlash thesis in the context of same-sex marriage, see GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABour SOCIAL CHANGE? 416 (2d
ed. 2008). For claims about the abortion decisions "shutting down politics" and causing backlash,
see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 YALE LJ. 2028,2028,2074 (2011), and Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 398-99.
ChiefJustice Roberts used the "shutting down" metaphor in his Obergefell dissent. Obergefell
. v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) ("There will be consequences
to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public significance."); see also
Cary Franklin, Roe as We Know It, 114 MICH. L. REV. 867, 882-83 (2016) (discussing ChiefJustice
Roberts's claim about "shutting down" politics and similar criticisms of the Obergefell decision
(quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting))).
31. Klarman, supra note 27, at 482 (discussing Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
Goodridgev. DepartmentofPublic Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).
32. Id. at 473.
33. Id. at 475.
34. Id (quoting Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2004, at Al).
35. Id at 482. Over time Klarman has qualified his views, suggesting that legislatures as well as courts
may trigger backlash when they take action that deviates from public opinion. See MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTER. COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1669 (2013) ("Political backlash results from government action that
strongly contravenes public opinion. Whether that action derives from legislatures or courts seems
relatively unimportant. Yet courts are more likely than legislatures to take action that is sufficiently
1736
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Klarman was joined by political scientist professor Gerald Rosenberg, best
known for the argument that racial desegregation resulted from the enforcement
of federal civil rights laws and not the Court's decision in Brown v. Board--one of
several decisions exemplifying the theory he famously called The Hollow Hope."
Court decisions could consolidate social change, but courts could not prompt social
change, Rosenberg argued. He pointed to the many laws and amendments
enacted to ban same-sex marriage. They demonstrated not only the futility but
also the perversity of seeking change through adjudication: "The battle for same-
sex marriage would have been better served if they had never brought litigation,
or had lost their cases."37
Concern about backlash to court decisions recognizing the right to marry
was not limited to academics. Faced with litigation losses and warnings of
backlash, gay rights litigators assumed a self-consciously cautious litigation strategy,35
seeking to avoid suits unless necessary." In 2008, when lawyers unaffiHiated with
the gay rights movement prepared to challenge state marriage bans under the
federal Constitution in Hollingsworth v. Perry,'" movement lawyers worked to
stop them from bringing the case.41 How would the public respond to a court
decision recognizing the constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry that
changed the law in all states? When unable to dissuade the lawyers in the Perry
case, the movement worked to shape litigation of the case.42
deviant from public opinion to generate powerful backlash."). The model still looks to public
opinion to change before law can change in socially beneficial ways.
36. ROSENBERG, supra note 30; see id at 431 ("Political organizing, political mobilization, and voter
registration... are the best if not the only hope to produce change.... [I]f those seeking
significant social reform build a mass political base, then the hope for reform will not be
hollow."). This cautionary account of how American same-sex marriage cases caused backlash has
traveled to Europe. See ANGIOLETIA SPERTI, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, GAY RIGHTS AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION EQuALIY 80-109 (2017) (drawing on literature on backlash in the
United States in the course of analyzing same-sex marriage legislation and litigation in Europe);
Frances Hamilton, Strategies to Achieve Same-Sex Marriage and the Method oflncrementalist Change,
25 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 121 (2015-16) (reviewing stories about backlash to same-sex
marriage decisions in the United States and advocating incrementalist change through legislation
rather than litigation).
37. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Lookingfor Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L.
REV. 795,812-15 (2006).
38. Mary L. Bonauto, Equality and the Impossible-State Constitutions and Marriage, 68 RUTGERS U.
L. REV. 1481, 1493-95, 1505-07 (2016); see Scott L. Cummings &Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering
forMarriazeEquality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235,1278,1284 (2010).
39. Cummings &NeJaime, supra note 38, at 1312-18.
40. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
41. Douglas NeJaime, TheLegalMobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY LJ. 663,698-99 (2012).
42. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 38, at 1310-12; see also KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW:
MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL 32-33,77-80 (2015).
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Judges began openly to speak about backlash as litigation of Perry
progressed. The district judge in Perry asked the plaintiffs'lawyers about the risk
of backlash before conducting a lengthy trial and ruling in their favor.43 As the
Perry case made its way toward the Supreme Court-along with the United States v.
Windsor" case challenging the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage
Act-a variety of academics and advocates urged judges to narrow or to avoid
decision in the cases, warning the Supreme Court that a court decision striking
down state same-sex marriage bans could trigger powerfil backlash.45
Even Supreme Court justices joined the conversation. In several public
interviews in 2012 and 2013, Justice Ginsburg offered not-so-veiled warnings
about the dangers of a Supreme Court decision in Perry by reiterating her view
that an early and overbroad ruling in Roe v. Wade' had caused backlash.47
The Court should not move "too far too fast," she cautioned.48 When the
Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act in Windsor but ruled
that the parties in Perry lacked standing to bring the case, Justice Kennedy objected
that the Court should not have avoided the merits and adverted to judicial
43. Transcript of Record at 3095, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2292-VRW (N.D. Cal June 16,
2010); see Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 30, at 2030.
44. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
45. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae William N. Eskridge Jr. et al. in Support of Respondents at 6, 7-9,
13, Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), 2012 WL 3838124, at *6, *7-9, *13 (observing that the
"prudential approach" that the Court employed in slowly adjudicating anti-miscegenation cases
was animated by backlash concerns and urging a similar approach in the marriage cases); William
N. Eskridge Jr. & Darren Spedale, Sit Down, Ted Olson and David Boies: Let the States Experiment
With Gay Marriage-It's Not Time Yet for a Federal Lawsuit, SLATE (May 29, 2009, 11:25 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/05/sit-downtedolson-an
d_davidboies.html [https-//perma.cc/SLR4-MV4W]; Michael McConnell, Opinion, Michael
McConnell: The Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage, WALL STREETJ. (Mar. 21,2013,7:37 PM),
http-//www.wsj.com/artides/SB10001424127887324281004578354300151597848
[https-//perma.cc/P822-KWJK]; Cass R. Sunstein, For the Supreme Court, Silence Can Be Golden,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 1, 2013,3:30 PM), http-//www.bloombergview.com/artides/2013-04-
01/for-the-supreme-court-silence-can-be-golden [https://perma.cc/JUW5-Q9DQ.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. David Crary, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Questions Timing of Roe v. Wade, Gives Hint on Same-Sex
Marriage Issue, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 11, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/2016
0124025651//http-//www.huffngtonpost.com/2012/02/10/ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade-
gay-marriage n_1269399.html [https-//perma.cc/GX6F-S8J7]; Colleen Walsh, Ginsburg Holds
Court, HARv. GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2013), http-//news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/02/
ginsburg-holds-court [https://perma.cc/7GV8-R726]; see also Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Geoffrey Stone, 'Roe at 40Y, U. CHI. L. SCH. (May 11, 2013), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/video/
ginsburg051113 [https-// perma.cc/5VN8-C75T].
48. Crary, supra note 47 (quoting Ginsburg, J.).
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concerns about backlash as he did so." Instead Perry sent the decision back to
the lower federal and state courts.s
Over the years, talk of backlash had changed shape and assumed variant
forms. Did backlash concern the question of whether courts could intervene in
democratic politics and vindicate minority rights or whether judges should intervene
in democratic politics and vindicate minority rights? Or was concern about
backlash not a whether question, but a when question: At what point in evolution
of public opinion should a lower court-or the Supreme Court-intervene?1
When in 2015 the Court finally recognized the right of same-sex couples to
marry, Chief Justice Roberts dissented, predicting backlash and quoting Justice
Ginsburg on the backlash that Roe v. Wade provoked.52 Michael Klarman
disagreed. By the time of Obergefell, Klarman was arguing that the Court could
decide the question of marriage without concern of backlash because there was
already majority public support for same-sex marriage (and because Obergefell,
unlike Brown or Roe, was likely to "have little direct impact on opponents'
lives").5 3
49. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Of course, the Court must be cautious before
entering a realm of controversy where the legal community and society at large are still formulating
ideas and approaches to a most difficult subject. But it is shortsighted to misconstrue principles of
justiciability to avoid that subject."). For an argument that the Court resolved Perry on standing
grounds to avoid the merits, see Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and
RacialEquality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 144-54 (2013).
50. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
51. See infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the fusion of descriptive and prescriptive
claims in backlash discourse).
52. Justice Roberts warned:
There will be consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of
such profound public significance. Closing debate tends to dose minds. People
denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not
seem to be the sort of thing courts usually decide. As a thoughtful commentator
observed about another issue, 'The political process was moving..., not swiftly
enough for advocates of quick, complete change, but majoritarian institutions were
listening and acting. Heavy-handed judicial intervention was difficult to justify and
appears to have provoked, not resolved, conflict."
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C. L. REV. 375,385-86 (1985)).
53. Michael Klarman, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Most Powerful When It Follows Pub/ic Opinion,




The judicial backlash thesis spread, not only because of the statutes,
amendments, and initiatives enacted to block court decisions protecting the right
of same-sex couples to marry but also because the judicial backlash thesis echoed
widespread realist views about the institution ofjudicial review.
In The Least Dangerous Branch, law professor Alexander Bickel famously
characterized the institution of judicial review as "counter-majoritarian." 54 But
scholars in political science have long reasoned differently, following the work of
Robert Dahl who characterized courts as majoritarian institutions. Backlash
theorists reason from Dahl's majoritarian view of courts.s In an admiring account,
backlash theorist Gerald Rosenberg observed of Dahl: "First, he found that the
Court historically had seldom strayed from the policy wishes of the lawmaking
majority, generally failing to protect minorities against majoritarian out-
comes.... Second, he found that when the Court did stray from the policy
wishes of the lawmaking majority, Congress overturned those decisions."56
Views of judicial review as majoritarian have increasingly spread in the
American legal academy-where academics have long argued in the shadow of
the countermajoritarian difficulty. This a shift in outlook that may reflect the
experience of living with a Supreme Court under fire, whose membership, and
interpretation of the Constitution, has shifted dramatically over the decades, and
is about to shift again.
Scholars highlight different processes that contribute to the majoritarian
logic of judicial review. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson observe that the
participation of the President and U.S. Senate in appointing judges produces
"partisan entrenchment" on the courts.s" Others emphasize judicial response to
public opinion as a key mechanism for coordinating law and politics. In The Will
of the People,s" Barry Friedman describes lines of cases demonstrating how the
Supreme Court has responded to "public opinion" over time: 'The accountability
54. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986) ('The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.").
55. Klarman, supra note 27, at 440 &n.68.
56. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Road Taken: Robert A. Dahts Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY LJ. 613, 622 (2001) (book review)
(footnotes omitted).
57. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1066-83 (2001).
58. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
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of the justices (and thus the Constitution) to the popular will has been established
time and time again. To the extent that the judges have had freedom to act, it has
been because the American people have given it to them. Judicial power exists at
popular dispensation."" Jeffrey Rosen also chronicles the Court's responsiveness
to public opinion.60  Other more informal accounts depict judicial review as
following social norms or popular consensus.' Majoritarian accounts of judicial
review echo beliefs about constitutional legitimacy: Just as the Constitution draws
authority from majoritarian consent procedures and informal indicia of popular
acceptance, so, too, does the institution of judicial review.62 Justin Driver terms
this trend in constitutional theory "consensus constitutionalism."63
In these realist accounts ofjudicial review, courts are tethered to representative
government through judicial appointments or conform to the vill of the majority
in the quest to avoid political reprisals and secure popular compliance with their
judgments. Courts can issue judgments that force regional majorities-so-called
"outliers" 64-to conform to majority views, but courts cannot issue judgments
that step too far ahead of popular opinion.
59. Id at 370.
60. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: How THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA, at xii (2006) ("In this book, I argue that the ... view--that courts are broadly in step
with public opinion-has tended, throughout American history, to be the most descriptively accurate.
Far from protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority or thwarting the will of the
people, courts for most of American history have tended to reflect the constitutional views of
majorities.").
61. See, e.g., CAsS R SUNSTEIN, A CONSTnunbN OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING
DOCUMENT DOESNT MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 4 (2009) (arguing that when the
Supreme Court announces a seemingly "new constitutional principle," it is usually merely "endorsing,
fairly late, ajudgment that has long attracted widespread social support from many minds").
62. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2015-16 (2012)
(reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011), and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)) ('he Constitution is not law today simply because its provisions
were adopted by the People in 1789, 1791, 1868, and so forth. The Constitution is law today
because it continues to be accepted today."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy andthe Constitution,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,1792 (2005) ("mhe legal legitimacy of the Constitution depends much
more on its present sociological acceptance (and thus its sociological legitimacy) than upon the
(questionable) legality of its formal ratification. Other fundamental elements of the constitutional
order, including practices of constitutional interpretation, also owe their legal legitimacy to current
sociological acceptance.").
63. Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 757, 767-76 (2011) (identifying a
school of "consensus constitutionalism" including Friedman, Klarman, and Sunstein).
64. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 565 (2009) ("[Tlhe federal judicial system asa whole acts as an ehforcer of national values in a
federal republic" by "bring[ing] stragglers and outliers-usually local and regional majorities-in
line with the constitutional views of the newly dominant national political coalition"); Justin Driver,
Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 930-50 (2014) (summarizing, before critiquing,
the concept of "constitutional outliers"); Klarman, supra note 27, at 483 (noting "the propensity of
constitutional law to suppress outliers"); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian"
1742 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728 (2017)
III. SOME REALISM ABOUT REALISM: RELATIONS OF CONFLICT THAT
CONSENSUS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM OBSCURES
In recent years, majoritarian accounts of judicial review have drawn fire. In
an article entitled Is the Supreme Court a 'Majoritarian"Institution 5 law professor
Richard Pildes demonstrates many forms of imprecision and ambiguity in the
claim that judicial review is "majoritarian,"66 and worries that the characterization
is likely to have pernicious effects. Views of the Court as majoritarian might lead
people to acquiesce in countermajoritarian decisions like Citizens Unitedv. Federal
Election Commission,"7 which invalidated electoral campaign finance laws as a vi-
olation of free speech." A different worry leads law professor Justin Driver to
criticize talk of "[t]he Consensus Constitution."69 Without an historical appreci-
ation of the ways that the Court defied popular opinion in prohibiting racial
segregation, he emphasizes, judges might grow timid in the protection of minority
rights. 0
Informal pictures of how law works guide judgment about doing law. They
play a role in orienting judgments of citizens, advocates, and officials, as talk of
backlash illustrates. Repeated description comes to support and guide prescription.
Institution, 2010 SUP. CT. REv. 103, 150 & n.172 (offering a brief summary of the outlier concept
and collecting sources); Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 305, 309 (2010) ("Much of the Warren Court's constitutional work, ... policed local
or regional outlier policies without contradicting anything approaching a national consensus.").
65. Pildes, supra note 64.
66. Pildes observes:
Different theorists appeal to different baselines for defining what constitutes the
"majoritarian views" that purportedly constrain the Court. Or the same theorists
invoke different concepts of "the majority" in different works. Moreover, some of
the baselines are so nebulous that it becomes almost impossible to confirm or falsify
the theory.
Id. at 117. He points out that "majoritarian" theorists like Barry Friedman, Jack Balkin, Keith
Whittington, Mark Graber, and Gerald Rosenberg disagree on the relevant baseline for what
counts as "majoritarian." Id. at 118-19. This leads to disagreement about whether landmark
constitutional decisions-Brown v. Board ofEducation, for example-were actually majoritarian or
were instead countermajoritarian. Id at 120-22. The "majoritarian" theorists can wrongly infer
from the Court's long-term "majoritarian" tendencies that, in the short-term, the Court exhibits
the same majoritarian behavior on a case-by-case basis. Id at 122-26. Majoritarian theorists also
disagree about how, in practice, democratic majorities constrain the Court's behavior. Id. at 126-
42. Finally, Pildes argues that Dahl's empirical observations have not held up over time, while
majoritarian theorists have collected little new data to replace it. Id at 142.
67. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
68. Id.
69. Driver, supra note 63.
70. Id at 800.
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So what then might be wrong with realist accounts that emphasize the
importance of public opinion in judicial decisions? Public opinion is important:
A Supreme Court decision recognizing same-sex marriage in 2015-when dose
to 60 percent of the American public supported marriage equalityn-is by far less
controversial than it would have been at the time of the Hawaii decision in the
1990s, when polls measured 60 percent of the American public opposing same-
sex marriage. 72
But one can acknowledge the importance of public opinion without treating
majority support as: (1) indispensable; or (2) sufficient to sustain a constitutional
ruling as realist accounts often do. For example, Michael Klarman voiced what I
believe is a widely shared intuition when he asserted that the Court could decide
Obergefellv. Hodgesn because public support had tipped in favor of marriage. On
this view, once a majority of the public supports a particular constitutional
understanding, the Court can settle conflict by imposing public consensus on
regional outliers.74
71. Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http-//www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (last
visited Sept. 19, 2017) (showing 58 percent of people in poll conducted July 8-12, 2015 believed
same-sex marriages should be legally valid). Other polls conducted around the same time, such as
one AP Poll, reflected weaker public support at only 42 percent approval. ASSOCIATED PRESS &
GFK PUB. AFF. & CORP. COMM., THE AP-GFK POLL 3 (2015), http://ap-gfkpoll.com/
main/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AP-GfK.PollJuly_2015-Topline-.gay-marriage.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/P3SA-HSF4]. However, this differs from the general trends visible in both the
Gallup, supra, and Pew Research Center polls from the same time, which both reflected public
support at more than 50 percent. PEW RESEARCH CTR., PEW RESEARCH CENTER MAY 2015
POLITICAL SURVEY FINAL TOPLINE 1 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/06/6-8-
15-Same-sex-marriage-topline-for-release.pdf [httpsi//perma.cc/K459-H9SR] (showing results
from a survey conducted May 12-18,2015 and reflecting 57 percent support for marriage equality).
72. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), as clarified on reconsideration, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993) (unpublished table decision). A national public opinion poll taken six months before Baebr
showed opposition to same-sex marriage at 60 percent. ACLU, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
ABOUT PRIVACY AT HOME AND AT WORK (1992), repinted in iPoll Question Details, ROPER
CTR. PUB. OPINION RES., https-//ropercenter.comell.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll/questionDe
tail.cfm? [https://perma.cc/M656-KM3Q}.
73. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
74. See Michael Klarman, Opinion, A Gay Marriage Backlash? Not Likely, LA TIMES (Mar. 24,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/opinion/la-oe-klarman-scotus-and-gay-marriage-
20130324 [https://perma.cc/U2PC-V33QJ- Michael Klarman, Opinion, Marriage Equality and
Political Backlash, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 1, 2015, 6:05 PM), httpi//www.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/26/civil-rights-decisions-in-courts-or-legislatures/mar
riaae-equality-and-political-backlash [https://perma.cc/H364-S69B]; see also David Fontana, The
justices' Justice, SLATE (June 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/artides/news-and pol
itics/iurisprudence/2015/06/supreme courtaymarriageruling..wecannow_stopjfearingsoc
ial.progress.html [https*//perma.cc/P7KU-EN3D]. On outliers, see supra note 64.
There is common sense authority to this account. But I believe that the
backlash narrative and the consensus model of constitutionalism on which it rests
lead us to underestimate and to overestimate the power ofjudicial review.
When consensus-based models of constitutionalism assess the effects of a
judicial opinion in a short time horizon, they may underestimate the capacity of
judges to shape public opinion. Ifwe consider the question in a longer time hori-
zon, we can see dynamics around judicial review that consensus-based models of
constitutionalism overlook. Obergefellgrew out of innumerable court and legislative
decisions, as appendices to the Court's own opinion emphasize 7s-with many of
these decisions growing out of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Lawrence
v. Texas76 and United States v. Windsor." The Court's decision in Obergefellwas
possible not simply because public opinion changed, but also because struggle
over the courts helped change public opinion and forge new constitutional
understandings. In short, as advocates and judges appreciate, adjudication creates
as well as reflects public opinion." While the judicial backlash thesis focuses on
the opposition that countermajoritarian rulings can arouse, that is only part of the
story. As I emphasize here and elsewhere, even when countermajoritarian judg-
ments arouse opposition, the judgments can create meanings that fatefully alter
the conditions of persuasion in political debate.79
At the same time, accounts of consensus constitutionalism may overestimate
the power of judicial review. The story of courts enforcing social consensus and
repressing regional "outliers" imputes to judicial review more power than courts
have. Again, consider the question in a longer time horizon. Public support for
gay marriage has risen dramatically over the last decade, but many Americans
75. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. app. A at 2608 (listing state and federal judicial opinions addressing same-sex
marriage); id app. B at 2611 (2015) (listing state legislation and judicial opinions that legalize
same-sex marriage).
76. 539 U.S. 558(2003).
77. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). For accounts that emphasize the importance of judicial decisions after
Windsor, see Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV.
1183 (2017). For accounts that emphasize the role of courts in shaping public opinion over a longer
time frame, see infra Part V.
78. See infra Part IV. For recent empirical work analyzing the legitimating effects of court decisions on
public opinion, see Benjamin G. Bishin et al., Opinion Backlash and Public Attitudes: Are Political
Advances in Gay Rights Counterproductive?, 60 AM. J. POL. SC. 625 (2016), and ANDREW R
FLORES & ScofT BARCLAY, WILLIAMS INST., TRENDS IN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES BY STATES (2015), http://williamsinstitute.law.uda.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Trends-in-Public-Support-for-Same-Sex-Marriage-2004- 2 014.pdf [https//
perma.cc/UW2K-T4Z5].
79. See Siegel, supra note 26, at 82 ("We can see that in the marriage debates, courts exercised authority
indirectly, as they injected constitutional questions into democratic deliberation, making minority
voices audible and informing political conflict with constitutional values.").
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remain passionately opposed, especially when one attends to differences in age,
region, religion, and political party.so And a plurality of citizens fiercely committed
to particular views will make itself felt in ways a majority diffusely committed to
particular views may not. For this reason, Americans opposed to same-sex
marriage have mobilized to continue the fight over marriage, seeking control over
the courts in campaigns for the presidency" and carrying their objections forward
under the banner of conscience and religious liberty.82 Just as Brown v. Board of
Education did not end debate over racial segregation," Obergefell has not ended
debate over marriage but instead has channeled it into new forms.84 Proponents
of same-sex marriage persisted in the face of loss, and so too will its opponents.
In what follows, I look back at backlash to same-sex marriage with attention
to the ways in which the fight over the courts--and other sites of government
80. Less than two months before the Obergefell decision, a national opinion poll by the Pew Research
Center found that 70 percent of white evangelical Protestants opposed allowing gays and lesbians
to marry legally, with 43 percent describing their opposition as strong. PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AT RECORD HIGH, BUr KEY SEGMENTS REMAIN
OPPOSED 3, 24 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/06/6-8-15-Same-sex-marriage-
releasel.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7VY-C3Z5] (displaying results from a poll conducted May 12-18,
2015). In the same opinion poll, 63 percent of Republicans and 54 percent of persons residing in
the South Central United States (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and Texas) expressed opposition to marriage rights for gays and lesbians. Same-Sex
Marriage Detailed Tables, PEW RES. CTR. (June 8, 2015), http-//www.people-press.
org/2015/06/08/same-sex-marriage-detailed-tables [https//perma.cc/BQW8-9JGQj; see also
Bishin et al., supra note 78, at 628 (noting white evangelicals as "the staunchest political
opponents of gay rights").
81. Numerous Republican candidates for the presidency opposed same-sex marriage and sought control
of the courts to change the law. See, e.g., Ryan J. Reilly, Marco Rubio Suggests His Supreme Court
WouldRollBack Marriage Equality, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 13,2015,11:59 AM), httpi//www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/marco-rubio-meet-the-press-marriage-us566d9098e4b0fcceel6ee695
[https://perma.cc/3NVP-SZLY] (noting that Rubio said he disagreed with the Court's marriage
decision and urged, "I don't believe any case law is settled law. Any future Supreme Court can
change it. And ultimately, I will appoint Supreme Court justices that will interpret the Constitution
as originally constructed"); Brian Tashman, Donald Trump: Trust Me'to Overturn the 'Shocking' Gay
Marriage Decision, RIGHT WING WATCH (Feb. 18, 2016, 11:25 AM), http-//www.rightwing
watch.org/content/donald-trmp-trust-me-overturn-shocking-gay-marriage-decision [https//
perma.cc/5LE5-E7LT]. For other Republican candidates who criticized the marriage decision
and promised to appoint jurists who would interpret the Constitution in accord with conservative
precepts, see Scott Bomboy, The Supreme Court as a 2016 Campaign Issue, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 16,
2015, 5:02 PM), http-//www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/TheSupremeCourt-as_a_2016-
electionissue.html [https://perma.cc/R4K6-ZHJS].
82. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 9, at 2558-65 (tracing the transformation of the marriage debate
into the religious liberties debate). For further discussion, see infra notes 142-154.
83. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk- Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (surveying a half-century of debate over
Brown's meaning).
84. See infra notes 107, 142-54 (discussing the emergence of religious liberty-based objections to
same-sex marriage).
decisionmaking-was constructive, and not merely destructive, as backlash theory
suggests. As conflict over same-sex marriage raged, citizens engaged in the
struggle to influence government decisionmakers helped to create new constitu-
tional meanings, and in the process, forged new relationships.
IV. BACKLASH REDUX- THEIVMARRIAGE CONFLICTS CONSTRUCTIVE
EFFECTS
Conflict can have constructive effects. We know that the first decisions
recognizing same-sex marriage sparked conflict that, in the short run, produced
immense setbacks. Judges who sought to impose new understandings of consti-
tutional law saw their judgments quickly reversed. Yet, it was precisely by
amplifying the claims of despised minorities in the legislative process that courts
changed the shape of the conflict over marriage and infused it with new meanings.
Opponents in other jurisdictions mobilized to enact bans on same-sex marriage
because they understood that court decisions recognizing the claim had imbued it
with increasing legitimacy. The countermobilization we call "backlash" was a
response to the claim's growing authority." The first marriage decisions thus had
mixed effects. As a growing number of commentators have observed, Goodridge
v. Department ofPublic Health" and other early decisions not only set back the
cause of same-sex marriage, but they also strengthened the claim's authority in a
variety of significant ways." The early court decisions were, as Robert Cover
might put it, "jurisgenerative."
85. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1362 ("Once a movement contests the jurisdiction of a constitutional
principle in a bid to renegotiate social structure, those who benefit from the contested understandings
and arrangements have reason to mobilize in their defense. Countermobilization is likely to occur
only as movement claims begin to elicit public response." (footnote omitted)).
86. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
87. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 21, at 309-23; Anthony Michael Kreis, Stages of ConstitutionalGrief
Democratic Constitutionalism and the Marriage Revolution, 20 U. PA J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
2018); Douglas Nelaime, Winning Through Losinx, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 986-1011 (2011); Jane
S. Schacter, Makinz Sense ofthe Marriage Debate, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1185,1195-99 (2013) (reviewing
KLARMAN, supra note 35); Siegel, supra note 26, at 77-85.
For early suggestions that the conflict could have constructive effects, see, for example, Ball, supra
note 21, and Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact ofJudicialDecisions on LGBT
Rights, 43 L. &SOC'Y REV. 151,155-60 (2009).
88. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword Nomos andNarrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 40-44 (1983). Through these decisions, state courts began a conversation with the American
people. Similarly, Alexander Bickel stated:
Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of
conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives.... [T]o
say that the Supreme Court lays down the law of the land is to state the ultimate
result, following upon a complex series of events, in some cases, and in others it is a
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The fight over marriage forged new meanings and altered relationships,
within movements, between movements, and in the public at large. Of course,
the conflicts we call backlash are by no means caused by courts alone.89 Courts
were not the only institutional site of conflict over marriage-yet the fight over
and through the courts shaped the debate over marriage in distinctive ways: 0
The early court decisions amplified minority claims: Court decisions made
claims for same-sex marriage visible and audible; for better or for
form of speech only. The effectiveness of the judgment universalized depends on
consent and administration.
ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1978).
89. See Siegel, supra note 26, at 74-76. As I have observed-
Backlash arcs across the decades because there are natural incentives in democratic
politics to appeal to those aggrieved by change, whether change transpires by
judicial decision, the great civil rights statutes of the 1960s, or the efforts of local
government to ensure a modicum of integration in basic social institutions.
Backlash is best understood, not as the repression of democratic politics, but its
expression: backlash escalates as movements, parties, and officials embrace the cause
of those who resent change, in the hopes ofwinning their support.
Id at 75 (footnote omitted).
Backlash may involve courts, but it can also spread without courts. In writing with Linda
Greenhouse, I have shown that conflict over abortion began before the Supreme Court ruled in
Roe. It escalated as Republicans used the abortion issue to recruit conservative Democrats to join
the Republican Party, a project that began before Roe and played out over the 1980s and 1990s. See
generally Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 30. The story of Roe as anti-democratic was constructed
as part of this political realignment process. See Franklin, supra note 30 (reviewing work on abortion
backlash by Greenhouse, Siegel, and Ziegler). Courts played little part in polarization around the
Equal Rights Amendment. See Siegel, supra note 2; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 406-24
(examining the role the ERA debates played in expanding the conflict over abortion). Polarization
around gun rights began decades before courts entered the debate over the Second Amendment.
See Reva B. Siegel, Dead orAlive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARv. L.
REV. 191 (2008).
90. It is a complex matter to ascertain whether and to what degree judicial decisions are responsible for
shaping conflict. Cf Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 38, at 1318-25 (analyzing whether the
enactment of two propositions banning same-sex marriage in California was due to the fact that a
court, rather than a legislature, had recognized same-sex marriages in the state); Kreis, supra note
87 (offering a state-by-state analysis and dosing "with a synthesis of all the evidence laid out to
conclude that courts were indeed largely responsible for the equal marriage revolution" (manuscript
at 5)). In what follows, I draw attention to distinctive ways that judicial decisions and conflict in
the courts shaped the marriage debate, but I do so without trying to sort out what portion of evolving
social norms can be attributed to judicial and extrajudicial sources. My central point is more modest.
Much of the literature on backlash assumes that adjudication was specially responsible for stoking
conflict in directions that harmed the case for marriage equality. Along with a number of others
cited in the following discussion, I show how judicial review contributed to building the case for
marriage equality, even as the decisions stimulated backlash. Nothing in what I argue assumes
courts were solely responsible for evolving public opinion-in the case of same-sex marriage any
more than in the case of abortion, see supra note 89. Rather, my point is the simpler one-that
judicial decisions advanced as well as retarded recognition of marriage equality. I identify pathways
through which adjudication shaped politics in support of marriage recognition, and not only in
opposition to it.
worse, court decisions put same-sex marriage on the public agenda at
a time when legislators would not do so.9 1
* The early court decisions helped legitimate unconventional views about
marriage. Court decisions changed meanings, and thus they changed
the conditions of political debate about same-sex marriage in a variety
of ways.
o Role modeling: Goodridge and other early state court decisions
created actual married same-sex couples and, through these
actual role models, allowed the nation to learn about
the consequences of same-sex marriage for same-sex
relationships, for children, and for the larger community.92
o Challenging Stereotypes: The Supreme Court's decisions in
Romer v. Evans" and Lawrence v. Texas94 limited the kinds
of derogatory claims that opponents could make about
same-sex marriage,9s while proponents of same-sex marriage
made liberty and equality arguments that challenged
stereotypes of gay sex and the family life of same-sex couples.96
o SymbolicAssociations: Claims on the Constitution transformed
arguments about marriage into a referendum on the
citizenship status of gays and lesbians. The right to marry
posed the question of equal citizenship for gays and lesbians,
much as the right to vote once raised questions of sex equality
for women and the right to attend integrated schools raised
questions of race equality for African Americans.9 7
* Thefight over the courts hada variety ofsocial mobilization efects:
o The early court decisions influenced intra-movement debate
about movement goals: The more the argument over marriage
turned.into a referendum on the equal status of gays in the
91. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 310-12.
92. See Ball, supra note 21, at 1527 ("It is reasonable to believe that many of the neighbors and co-
workers of married same-sex couples in Massachusetts are realizing that what they share with lesbian
and gay couples (in terms, for example, of commitment and love for their partners and families) is
greater and more important than the differences as represented by the gender of the parties.").
93. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
94. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
95. Romer and Lawrence limited the openly denigrating kinds of arguments advocates could employ
against same-sex marriage in public fora. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. These
decisions helped change arguments against same-sex marriage from gay-denigrating to gay-
respecting in form. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., WLLIAM N. ESKRIDGEJR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FITURE
OF GAY RIGHTS 146-47,183-84 (2002); YOSHINO, supra note 42, at 155-63.
97. For reflection on these themes, see Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1, 68-69 (2005), in which Bonauto, the lead attorney for Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders in Goodridge, reflects on the significance of marriage equality.
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community, the more the LGBT movement invested in the
question. A movement that once understood itself as seeking
sexual freedom came to understand itself through the
institution of the family."
o The decisions fostered inter-movement dialogue: As advocates
attempted to persuade decision-makers accountable to wider
publics, each side was obliged to answer arguments of the
other. Vying to persuade judges and the larger public, each
side incorporated elements of the other's views.99 LGBT
advocates responded to conservative arguments by espousing
fidelity to family values, and defenders of traditional marriage
responded to liberal arguments by espousing commitments
to equality values.100
These observations suggest some of the pathways through which even bitterly
contested judicial decisions can shape conflict, even as the decisions provoke
backlash and countermobilization. Judges could not resolve the debate over mar-
riage, but the prospect ofjudicial intervention disciplined argument. Objections
to same-sex marriage evolved in form, from gay-denigrating to gay-respecting
modes of constitutional argument.
In the 1980s and 1990s, it was commonplace to oppose same-sex marriage
by depicting it as deviant and immoral. The legislative history of the Defense of
Marriage Act vividly captures this phase of public debate.101 (Courts in this era
regularly denied gays protection against discrimination; why accord discrimina-
tion against gays heightened equal protection scrutiny when the conduct that
defined the dass was "criminalizable"? 02 )
But in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decisions in Romer and Lawrence
according gays rudimentary protections against discrimination,103 objections to
98. The movement remains divided on the importance of marriage, with proponents now ascendant.
See Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 379, 390-93
(2009).
99. See generally Siegel, supra note 2, at 1403-14 (analyzing forms of dialogue that occur in
constitutional conflict).
100. See id at 1415-18; infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 17,082 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("Rather than focus on the lee
need for this legislation, I would like to discuss some of the reasons why I feel it is morally necessary.);
142 CONG. REC. 16,972 (1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn) (claiming homosexuality is "based on
perversion" and "lust").
102. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting a claim that discrimination
against gay job applicants by the FBI violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court reasoned
that "[i]f the [Supreme] Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that
defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination
against the class is invidious").
103. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing Romer and Lawrence).
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same-sex marriage voiced in public settings began to shift into a gay-respecting
mode. In the 2000s, litigants and judges began to justify restricting marriage
to different sex couples in terms focused on the needs and vulnerabilities of
heterosexuals. Heterosexual couples needed incentives to marry (the so-called
"accidental procreation" argument'"), and children needed different sex parents
to model gender roles for them (the "dual gender" marriage argumentlos). Con-
servative opponents of same-sex marriage objected to being outcast as "bigots""
and asserted the importance of preserving traditional marriage to protect "religious
liberty."' Publicly expressed opposition to same-sex marriage increasingly came
to focus on a (gay-respecting) claim about the proper role of courts: There might
in fact be a case for recognizing same-sex marriage, opponents argued, but in a
constitutional democracy, that question is for determination by legislatures, not
104. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Center for Law &Justice in Support of Respondent
Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund at 2, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal.
2008) (No. S 147999), 2007 WL 3167052, at *2 ('The state's purpose in civil marriage is to channel
'the erotic and interpersonal impulses between men and women in a particular direction: one in
which men and women commit to each other and to the children that their sexual unions commonly
(and even at times unexpectedly) produce.' (quoting DAN CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY
LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRIsIs IN NORTH AMERIcA 13 (2005))); Kerry Abrams &
Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message. Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric ofAccidental Procreation, 21
YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2009).
105. See, e.g., Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 63, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 14
Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (No. 20011674A), 2001 WL 35920960, at *63 ("In
addition to their primary purpose of fostering procreation per se, the marriage statutes were intended
to ensure that children would not only be born in wedlock but also reared by their mothers and
fathers in one self-sufficient family unit with specialized roles for wives and husbands."); see also
Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, & Douglas NeJaime., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in
Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461, 489-92 (2007) (discussing
the appearance of arguments for different-gender role models in state court opinions and amicus
briefs).
106. For an overview of these arguments, see Siegel, supra note 26, at 78-80.
107. See, e.g., Brief of Douglas Laycock et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), 2015 WL 1048450. Religious liberty and the
demand for the accommodation of conscience are now the rallying cries of those mobilizing against
the Court's decision in Obergefell. See, for example, the litigation arising out of Rowan County
Clerk Kim Davis's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples after Obergefell. Lyle
Denniston, Clerk Freed Her Appeals on Same-Sex Marriage Go on, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 8, 2015,
6:55 PM), http://www.scorusblog.com/2015/09/derk-freed-her-appeals-on-same-sex-marriage-
go-on [https://perma.cc/6Q8W-68VC]. Others object to being made complicit in the recognition
of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. H5024 (daily ed. July 9, 2015) (statement of Rep.
Babin) ("We should also pass the First Amendment Defense Act to protect churches, Christian
schools and colleges and business owners from being coerced by the government to act against their
religious convictions in regards to acceptance of same-sex marriage."). See generally NeJaime &
Siegel, supra note 9 (drawing on social movement sources to show how objections to same-sex
marriage were reworked into religious liberty and conscience objections).
courts. For example, in his Obergefell v. Hodges' dissent, ChiefJustice Roberts
conceded that the claim to marital recognition "has undeniable appeal; over the
past six years, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia
have revised their laws to allow marriage between two people of the same sex."
"But," he insisted, "this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is
a good idea should be of no concern to us."109
Evolving objections to marriage signaled rising respect for gays among
citizens, judges, and possibly, among opponents of same-sex marriage
themselves."'o These changes in the grounds of constitutional argument illustrate
how constitutional conflict can foster relationships, even among adversaries who
fiercely disagree about the meaning of constitutional norms to which they share
fealty.
The judicial backlash thesis does not treat as significant these changes in the
shape of the conflict over same-sex marriage. The backlash framework evaluates
judicial review within a short time horizon"' and tends to rely on opinion polls
(and other practices of counting112) to identify circumstances in which courts
can successfully intervene and resolve conflict in such a way as to enforce social
consensus.
But when we look at conflict over a longer time horizon, and with attention
to the understandings that guide participants in constitutional conflicts, we can
appreciate ways in which struggle over the law is the locus of significant social
bonds that can engender evolving constitutional understandings.
108. 135 S. Ct. 2584.
109. Id at 2611 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
110. For example, during oral argument in Perry, Justice Sotomayor asked petitioners' counsel Charles
Cooper, "[O]utside of the marriage context, can you think of any other rational basis .. .for a State
using sexual orientation as a factor in denying homosexuals benefits or imposing burdens on them?"
Cooper replied, "Your Honor, I cannot. I do not have . .. anything to offer you in that regard."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
111. Five years after the Goodridge decision, Gerald Rosenberg argued that the litigation strategy was
counterproductive. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. By contrast, Bonauto, who led
litigation in the case, invoked the race cases as precedent, and emphasized that the constructive
effects of the decision would emerge in a longer time horizon. Bonauto, supra note 97, at 68-69.
On the relevance of time horizons in assessing backlash, see DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF
LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTTONAL LAW 50 (2016).
112. There is a widely held view that judicial review can impose national uniformity on regional outliers.
See Driver, supra note 64; qC Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
17, 17 (2009) (describing the Supreme Court's practice of "counting states' laws in a variety of
doctrinal contexts to determine the legislative consensus among the States" and arguing that this
serves as a useful check on judicial power to announce new national norms). The outlier framework
plays an important role in consensus constitutionalism. For its use in the marriage context, see supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
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V. UNDERSTANDING BACKLASH THROUGH THE LENS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
We talk about backlash and the countermajoritarian difficulty as if judicial
review "shuts down" politics," 3 but of course it does not. In fiercely contested
constitutional cases, citizens often mobilize in opposition to judicial decisions.
This conflict may be distressing to those who participate in or witness it, but it
can forge relationships that strengthen the constitutional order as a whole. In my
work, I have employed concepts of constitutional culture to explore the role-
based understandings that mediate conflicts over the meaning of constitutional
commitments while sustaining community in disagreement." 4
On the most familiar account, constitutional culture refers to the social
norms, values, and beliefs that give shape to a society's constitutional law.".
Without disputing the power of social norms to shape law, I have focused on
aspects of constitutional culture that enable law to shape social norms.
Constitutional culture includes both popular and professional beliefs about law,
in particular, the beliefs about institutions and authority that structure the roles
of citizens and officials in disagreements about the Constitution's meaning." 6
Understandings about role and authority guide citizens and officials making
113. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
114. See Siegel, supra note 2.
115. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term-Foreword Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Cours, andLaw, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4,8 (2003) (defining constitutional culture as "a specific
subset of culture that encompasses extrajudicial beliefs about the substance of the Constitution").
116. Siegel, supra note 2, at 1325-26.
A number of scholars interested in popular constitutionalism now use the concept of
constitutional culture to drAw attention to communicative pathways between citizens and officials.
In these accounts, the concept of constitutional culture typically refers to substantive beliefs about
the Constitution's meaning-and not the beliefs about authority and role that guide citizens and
officials in conflicts over the Constitution's meaning. See, e.g, Balkin, supra note 64, at 605
("Indeed, we can define a constitutional culture to a significant extent by what claims both
ordinary citizens and professionals regard as reasonable and unreasonable, 'off-the-wall' and 'on-
the-wall.' Citizens and professionals may differ in these judgments from time to time, but this is
also an important aspect of constitutional culture, because it means that popular opinion and
popular mobilizations may, over time, alter professional judgments."); Lani Guinier, Courting the
People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L. REv. 539, 547-48 (2009)
("Constitutional culture is the fish tank in which the beliefs and actions of judicial as well as
nonjudicial participants swim. It is the 'dynamic sociopolitical environment' in which ideas about
legal meanings circulate, ferment, compete and ultimately surface in formal venues such as legal
advocacy or legislative actions." (quoting Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court 2007 Term-Foreword
Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59 (2008)); Gerald Torres & Lani
Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We the People, 71 MD. L. REv. 1052,
1067 (2012) ("While the lawyers and judges formally construct the law, lay actors can also influence
how the law is interpreted, enforced, or in fact popularly understood through their participation in
the creation of our constitutional culture.").
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judgments about when they need to defer to one another, and when they can
challenge each other's views and pronouncements, and how. These role-based
understandings allow citizens and officials arguing about the Constitution's
meaning to assert independence from one another, while laboring under the
constraint to defer to one another, producing the evolving interpretations of the
Constitution that sustain its democratic legitimacy over time."'
Because of these understandings about role, great constitutional controversies
typically unfold along two axes, as debates about the Constitution's meaning and
as debates about the respective prerogatives of officials and citizens to act when
their understandings about the Constitution's meaning diverge. Southern
officials famously greeted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education1 s with determination to resist "by all lawfil mieans"" 9-encouraging
practices of resistance that would prompt the Court's assertion of judicial
supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron.120
In the heat of constitutional controversies, these competing assertions of
role authority are fiercely debated but rarely resolved.121 As we know, the Court's
assertion ofjudicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron did not go unquestioned but led
instead to democratic objections of diverse forms.1 22 Decades later, when President
Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese countered claims ofjudicial supremacy
by asserting the equal authority of coordinate branches of the federal government
117. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1349.
118. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
119. 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956) (statement of Sen. George). See generally Justin Driver, Supremacies
and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2014) (discussing reception of the
statements by Senator George-popularly termed the "Southern Manifesto"-as a respectable
statement of law that required response by those who supported the Court's decision in Brown).
120. 358 U.S. 1, 1, 18 (1958) (holding, in response to claims by "the Governor and Legislature [of
Arkansas] that they are not bound by [the Court's] holding in Brown," that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system").
121. See supra Siegel, supra note 2, at 1327; cf Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1041 (2004) ("The deference
due to judicial opinions and judgments is worked out, issue by issue, over time, with distinct points
of equilibria achieved and unsettled in substantive disputes over controverted questions of
constitutional governance. The practice of disturbing these uncertain and unstable boundaries is
in fact the practice of constitutional dialogue, fraught precisely because of the multiple and
inconsistent values that are in play.").
122. Ernest A. Young, Constitutionalism Outside the Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 843, 843-44 (Mark Tushnet et al eds., 2015); qC Post & Siegel, supra note
121, at 1040 ('The broader the reach of constitutional law, the more nonjudicial actors are bound
by the legal vision of courts, and the more diminished is the space for the political creation of the
Constitution.").
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to interpret the Constitution,'23 outcry led him to retreat but only in part.'24
When Iowans opposed the reelection ofjudges who recognized same-sex marriage
under the state constitution, their effort to demonstrate "[it's we the people, not
we the courts"'12  prompted impassioned defenses of judicial independence.1 26
Yet these assertions ofjudicial independence did not diminish objections to judicial
resolution of the marriage question, which dominated the opinions of the Justices
who dissented in Obergefellv. Hodges.127
123. President Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese argued:
If a constitutional decision is not the same as the Constitution itself, if it is not
binding in the same way that the Constitution is, we as citizens may respond to a
decision with which we disagree.... Once we understand the distinction between
constitutional law and the Constitution, once we see that constitutional decisions
need not be seen as the last words in constitutional construction .. ., we can grasp a
correlative point: constitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only,
but also properly the business of all branches of government.
Edwin Meese m, The Law ofthe Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979,985 (1987).
124. Meese responded to the criticisms:
Putting the worst construction on what I did not say, The Post wondered whether
the speech might be "an invitation to constitutional chaos and an expression of
contempt for the federal judiciary and the rule of law." I believe it is important not
only to put these concerns to rest but also to emphasize again the point of the
speech-that our Constitution is the supreme or paramount law of the land.
Meese, supra note 1, at 1003 (quoting Why Give That Speech?, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 1986)).
Meese's re-statement of his views is the source of the epigraph that opens this article. See supra
note 1 and accompanying text. Departmentalism, the equal authority of coordinate branches of the
federal government to interpret the Constitution, remains a site of continuing debate. Publication
of Larry Kramer's book, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004), which asserted departmentalist views from a different political perspective,
occasioned renewed debate. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (book review); Laurence H. Tribe, The People
Themselves'-JudicialPopulism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 24,2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/
books/review/the-people-themselves-judicial-populism.htnl. Robert Post and I responded to
Kramer's book in Post & Siegel, supra note 121. Eg., id at 1029 ("In contrast to Kramer, we do
not understand judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism to be mutually exclusive systems
of constitutional ordering."). For an earlier defense of "Cooper and its assertion ofjudicial primacy
without qualification," see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997).
125. Sulzberger, supra note 28 (quoting Bob Vander Plaats, the leader of the campaign to recall "three
Iowa Supreme Court justices who were part of the unanimous decision that legalized same-sex
marriage in the state").
126. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Cheap Seats: How Sandra Day O'Connor Got Drawn Into the Gay-
Marriage Debate in Iowa, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2010, 6:37 PM), http-//www.slate.com/artides/news
andpolitics/jurisprudence/2010/09/cheap-seats.htrnl [https://perma.cc/RG6C-JYKK] (discussing
a speech Justice O'Connor delivered in Iowa criticizing judicial elections); see also Grant Schulte,
O'Connor: Iowa Selection Process Is Fair, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 9,2010, at Bl.
127. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) ("But this Court is not a legislature.
Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us."); id at 2631 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("With each decision of ours that takes from the People a question properly left to
them--with each decision that is unabashedly based not on law, but on the 'reasoned judgment' of
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When conflict is mediated through the role-based understandings of con-
stitutional culture in this way, conflict takes the shape of a debate about what it
means to live in a constitutional democracy committed to the rule of law.
Through conflicts of this kind, law and politics constrain each other.
As struggles over same-sex marriage illustrate, constitutional conflict
produces important social goods. Conflict constrained by the role-based interac-
tions of constitutional culture helps "steer" constitutional development over time;
it also promotes the "attachment" to the Constitution of those who may be deeply
estranged from official pronouncements of the law.128
In certain respects the story is a familiar one. Theorists of free speech, proce-
dural justice, federalism, and the rule of law emphasize that outlets for voicing
and acting on dissent play a crucial role in maintaining the authority of law.129
a bare majority of this Court-we move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence."); id
at 2643 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("'Today's decision shows that decades of attempts to restrain this
Court's abuse of its authority have failed.").
128. I have examined these dynamics in my work exploring how social movement conflict shapes the
Constitution's meaning and authority. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1328 (observing that "popular
deliberation about constitutional questions guides officials in enforcing the Constitution and promotes
citizen attachment to the Constitution" and "suggesting that the constitutional order's openness to
change may invite the engagement and inhibit the estrangement of a normatively divided polity,
and so enable forms of solidarity that dispute resolution cannot.").
129. Drawing on a body of First Amendment scholarship premised on the view that "a government's
legitimacy in the eyes of the minority depends in part on its creation of channels for dissent,"
Heather Gerken emphasizes dissent's importance in "[florging civic ties" and "bind[ing] dissenters
to the community," and in affirming the dignity of the dissenter. Heather IC Gerken, Dissenting by
Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745,1775-76 (2005).
Like the scholarship on dissent, scholarship on procedural justice also emphasizes that
opportunities for voice and participation engender civic attachment and enhance the government's
authority. Tom Tyler has shown us that an individual's experience with legal procedures affects her
willingness to accept decisions with which she disagrees: It matters to the litigant to have a neutral
arbiter whom she mists, to have an opportunity to voice her perspective, and to be addressed with
respect by legal authorities. Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 27
(2007) ("Because it provides all parties with desirable experiences with the courts, procedural justice
is a key to the development of stable and lasting solutions to conflicts."). See generally TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (arguing that people obey the law because of its
perceived legitimacy).
In his work on the rule of law, Jeremy Waldron has emphasized that the procedural aspects of
law enable practices of argument that in turn vindicate individual dignity. SeeJeremy Waldron, The
Rule ofLaw and the Importance ofProcedure, in NOMOS L: GETTINGTO THE RULE OF LAW 3,23
(James E. Fleming ed., 2011). Waldron observes:
[L]aw is an argumentative discipline, and no analytic theory of what law is and what
distinguishes legal systems from other systems of governance can afford to ignore this
aspect of our legal practice and the distinctive role it plays in a legal system's treating
ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence. A fallacy of modem
positivism, it seems to me, is its exclusive emphasis on the command-and-control
aspect of law, or the norm-and-guidance aspect of law, without any reference to the
culture of argument that a legal system frames, sponsors, and institutionalizes.
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Yet constitutional theory remains oriented around consent as the key source of
the Constitution's legitimacy."'o It is less common for scholars in the field to
explore the role of conflict in preserving the Constitution's authority and in
sustaining attachment of those who are estranged from the Court's rulings.'
Entertaining these possibilities makes sense of many features of the consti-
tutional order that we ignore when we reason as if consent is the sole source of
constitutional meaning and community. Ongoing conflict about many crucial
questions of constitutional law is commonplace, constrained by the role-based
understandings of constitutional culture. When conflict is channeled in this way,
it enacts a form of community in disagreement that can forge new constitutional
meanings.132
Id at 21-22 (footnote omitted). For scholarship on dissent in the literature on federalism, see infra
note 136.
These bodies of scholarship suggest that the role understandings of constitutional culture
which enable Americans to fight over constitutional meaning provide forms of participation and
voice that may be crucial in securing the Constitution's authority.
130. Constitutional theorists of many kinds ground the Constitution's authority in agreement. See, e.g.,
BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 269-71 (1998) (offering a theory
of constitutional moments that identifies forms of interbranch dialogue that function as
"amendment analogues" and can give formal expression to the considered agreements of Americans
about the foundational commitments that ought to guide national life); Jack M. Balkin, The
Construction ofOriginalPublic Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 74 (2016) ("What makes the
Constitution law is the consent of the ratifying public-We the People-who give assent to
the text presented to them."). This focus on consent as a crucial source of the Constitution's authority
also funds the social-realist accounts of consensus-based constitutionalism discussed in Part II. See
also Fallon, supra note 62, at 1792 ("mhe legal legitimacy of the Constitution depends much more on
its present sociological acceptance (and thus its sociological legitimacy) than upon the (questionable)
legality of its formal ratification. Other fundamental elements of the constitutional order, including
practices of constitutional interpretation, also owe their legal legitimacy to current sociological
acceptance.").
131. But see, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); LOUIS MICHAEL
SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001). Robert Post and I approach conflict from this vantage point in
our work on democratic constitutionalism. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 2. For a discussion of
theories of judicial dialogue that value conflict, and their implications for Obergefells reception, see
Glen Staszewski, Obergefell andDemocracy, 97 B.U. L. REV. 31, 98-101 (2017).
132. I have argued.
[C]onstitutional culture supplies understandings of role and practices of argument
through which citizens and officials can propose new ways of enacting the society's
defining commitments-as well as resources to resist those proposals.
Constitutional culture preserves and perpetually destabilizes the distinction between
politics and law .... When constitutional culture can hamess the energies of social
conflict, agents of deeply agonistic views remain engaged in constitutional dispute,
speaking through the Constitution rather than against it.
Siegel, supra note 2, at 1327.
Sociologists who examine the integrative role of conflict include LEWIS A. COSER, THE
FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956), and Georg Simmel, The Sociology ofConflict, 9 AM.J.
SOC. 490 (1904). Work on the relational character of political conflict spans political theory and
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Looking back at the debates preceding Obergefell, we can see how the
understandings of role supplied by constitutional culture help create meaning
and maintain community in the midst of passionate disagreement. Because
advocates appreciate that officials accountable to the public have power to make
binding decisions about constitutional questions, adversaries argue their case by
appeal to constitutional values and memories that can persuade others who do
not share their views."' Because advocates appreciate that there are multiple fora
in which they can press their case, adversaries can persist in constitutional
argument, even when they lose.134
In the United States, role-literate participants understand that the American
constitutional order is a hierarchy headed by the U.S. Supreme Court and
beneath it, fifty state supreme courts, all acting with authority to say what the law
is. Yet participants also understand that in this system there are plural
decisionmakers-forms of "jurisdictional redundancy,"' heterarchy as well as
hierarchy.'"' It does not take a scholar of popular constitutionalism to explain
law. See Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement. Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1336-40 (2010) (discussing this theme in the work of Chantal Mouffe,
Jacques Rancire, Bernard Crick, Hannah Arendt, and Jeremy Waldron). For accounts that
emphasize the integrative role of conflict in a federated system, see infra note 136.
133. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. Elsewhere I have termed this the "public value"
condition. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1356-57 ("[T]he public value condition requires advocates to
justify new constitutional understandings by appeal to older constitutional understandings that the
community recognizes and shares.... The public value condition requires advocates to translate
partial and partisan judgments about constitutional meaning into the language of a common
tradition.").
134. For examples, see supra Part IA.
135. Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM.
&MARY L. REv. 639,649 (1981). For one recent expression of Cover's insights, see Alexandra D.
Lahav, Recovering the Social Value ofJurisdictionalRedundancy, 82 TUL. L REv. 2369, 2372 (2008)
("In formulating measures for reform of our judicial systems we should consider the ability of multiple
centers of adjudication to encourage socially beneficial institutional conflict and plural conceptions
of the good.").
136. In a heterarchical system such as the European Union, important questions of fnal legal authority
remain unsettled. Daniel Halberstam argues that in certain respects the United States is a
heterarchical or pluralist legal order like the European Union. Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional
Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States, in RULING THE
WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 326
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff &Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). For an American "analogue to Europe's
essential characteristic of unsettled legality and finality," Halberstam looks not to federalism but to
the separation of powers: "Here, a similar terrain of contestation and lack of finality operates in the
United States among the various branches of the federal government, that is, among the President,
the Congress, and the Supreme Court of the United States. According to some, it even extends to
'the people themselves.' Each of these actors has a plausible claim to being the final arbiter of legality
within the American constitutional system." Id at 331-32 (footnote omitted) (quoting Mark
Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as PopularLaw, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991,991(2006)).
that even when the Supreme Court renders final judgment, there are many ways
in which critics can work to restrict the reach of the Court's decisions and
to change the Court's members. Those who believe the Court's judgments
wrong or even illegitimate need not be wholly estranged but instead can contest
those Court's judgments as an act of fidelity to the Constitution.
There is both closure and openness in this system, settlement and unsettle-
ment. Citizens understand they are subject to the authority of decisionmakers
whom they must persuade yet whose authority they also know how to contest.
The need to persuade and the ability to contest each play a part in sustaining
engagement. These understandings about role-about when to defer to govern-
ment decisions and how to challenge them-allow for dialogue in constitutional
systems where courts are thought to have the final word.137
When citizens are engaged in conflict that is mediated in these ways, conflict
may hone arguments into new sources of constitutional meaning. Adversaries
understand that they have an opportunity to shape law if they can translate
their convictions into arguments with sufficiently broad-based appeal to refute their
opponents' claims and persuade (or discredit) officials who are accountable to the
larger public. Conflict structured in this triadic form can exert a moderating
influence on adversaries' arguments, and transform them into claims about the
There are several accounts that emphasize the pluralist dimensions of federalism and the
integrative role of conflict in a federated system. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s),
53 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1549,1567 (2012) ("[W]e continue to emphasize federalism's hierarchical
dimensions rather than imagining federal-state relations as we do the relations between the three
branches-as a system that mixes conflict and cooperation to produce governance."); Heather K
Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term-Foreword Federalism All the Way Don, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 9 (2010) ("[Orienting constitutional theory around federalism-all-the way-down would
help us build a more satisfying nationalist account of federalism, one that emphasizes the integrative
role that discord and division can play in a well-functioning democracy."); Judith Resnik,
Accommodations, Discounts, and Displacement: The Variability ofRights as a Norm ofFederalism(s),
17JUS POLTECUM 209,213 (2017) ("[F]ederalism enables participatory opportunities that create
plural sources of law.... The plural legal sources within a federation generate conflict... Instead
of aspiring to 'the tranquility of the state' (to borrow from Thomas Aquinas), federalism entails
discord, as an ongoing feature and as apositive attribute of govemance" (footnote omitted)); Cristina
M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123
YALE L.J. 2094, 2097 (2014) ("[F]ederalism constitutes a framework for national
integration. ... It creates a multiplicity of institutions with lawmaking power through which to
develop national consensus, while establishing a system of government that allows for
meaningful expressions of disagreement when consensus fractures or proves elusive. .. .").
137. It is constitutional culture that allows one to challenge the judgments of the courts in systems that
have what Mark Tushnet terms "strong-form" judicial review, and that invite deference to judicial
decisions in systems that have what he terms "weak-form" review. Mark Tushnet, Alternative
Forms ofjudicialReview, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2782-86 (2003). Christine Bateup explores
the paradox that there may be more system-wide dialogue in systems with stronger judicial review.
See Christine Bateup, Comment, Reassessing the Dialogic Possibilities of Weak-Form Bills ofRights,
32 HASTINGS INTL &COMP. L. REV. 529,593-95 (2009).
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Constitution that command widespread support and recognition. In this way,
"constitutional culture channels social movement conflict to produce enforceable
constitutional understandings."'
Looking at how the role-based understandings of constitutional culture
constrained and channeled the conflict over same-sex marriage, we can see how
Americans-acting in courts, legislatures, and civil society--argued in ways that
created conditions of plausibility for the Court's decision in Obergefel,139 a
dynamic Justice Kennedy expressly and repeatedly acknowledges in his opinions
on same-sex marriage.1 40  New constitutional meanings were forged through
backlash. However bitterly contested, the Court's decision in Obergefell is more
plausible today than it would have been twenty years earlier.
Yet, Obergefell is still bitterly contested. Even if popular majorities now
support the Court's judgment, a mobilized and large plurality does not.141 New
constitutional meanings are still being forged through backlash, as these Americans
arguing in Obergefells wake try to shape the decision's meaning for the next phase
of conflict.
138. Siegel, supra note 2, at 1323. For a reflection on the ways that the triadic form of the conflict may
exert "a moderating influence on the claims movements advance," see id. at 1363-65. For an
illustration of how this dynamic played out in the same-sex marriage conflict, see supra notes 99-
100 and accompanying text.
139. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1418 (observing the debate over marriage in 2006 and that "[o]ver time,
the dispute is assuming a structure in which the Court can pronounce constitutional law, and have
its pronouncement appear as an intelligible, if contestable, account of the Constitution's meaning").
140. Justice Kennedy counters the objection that courts should defer to democratic deliberation about
same-sex marriage with the observation that judicial decisions have grown out of popular deliberation:
Yet there has been far more deliberation than this argument acknowledges.
There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as
countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings. There
has been extensive litigation in state and federal courts. See Appendix A, infra.
Judicial opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of
parties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of
same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As
more than 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of the central institutions in
American life-state and local governments, the military, large and small businesses,
labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional
organizations, and universities-have devoted substantial attention to the question.
This has led to an enhanced understanding of the issue-an understanding reflected
in the arguments now presented for resolution as a matter of constitutional law.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015); see also id at 2597 (observing that the debate
over same sex marriage was shaped by "years of litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussions
that attended these public acts, the States are now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage");
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) ("After a statewide deliberative process
that enabled its citizens to discuss and weigh arguments for and against same-sex marriage, New
York acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood.").
141. See supra note 80.
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Exercising role-literacies of constitutional culture, critics of same-sex
marriage have appealed to the nation's shared commitment to religious liberty
as a ground on which to impose limits on Obergefell.14' By seeking religious
liberty exemptions-from laws concerning marriage and interactions with those
who marry-opponents can express their continuing objections to same-sex
marriage without directly defying the Court's judgment. Mobilizing as Christians
seeking exemptions from the heavy hand of the law, opponents now speak as
religious minorities asserting fill-throated objections to same-sex marriage that
before Obergefell they asserted as legislative majorities.143. (Elsewhere I have
termed this kind of shift in the form and justification of legal claims "preservation
through transformation."'"*)
142. Opponents of Obeigefellplanned to shift their arguments into appeal to religious liberty even before
the Court's decision. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 9. As soon as the Court decided Obergefell,
opponents invoked religious liberty as a principle to limit the Court's decision. SeeJordain Carney,
McConnell: Congress Can't Roll Back Gay Marriage Decision, HILL (July 1, 2015, 10:56 AM),
http-//thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/246637-mcconnell-congress-cant-roll-back-gay-marriage-
decision [https://perma.cc/UPU8-78QC] (reporting that the U.S. Senate Majority Leader greeted
the decision with the observation that "I think the courts have pretty well spoken. Well be taking a
look at whether or not religious liberty needs to be enhanced by statue [sic]").
Opponents are now seeking to enact laws at the federal and state level protecting persons who
object on religious grounds to interacting with persons in same-sex unions. See Barber v. Bryant,
193 F. Supp. 3d 677 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of Mississippi's religious
exemptions law which grants special rights to citizens who hold particular religious or moral beliefs,
specifically that "[m]arriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman;
[s]exual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and [m]ale (man) or female (woman)
refer to an individual's immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics
at time of birth"), rev'd, 860 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2017)); First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802,
114th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (2015) ("[The Federal Government shall not take any discriminatory
action against a person, wholly or partially, on the basis that such person believes or acts in accordance
with a religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of
one man and one woman, or sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage."). For an
account of the groups networked in opposition to Obergefell, see Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, Here
They Are, the Enemies ofEquality' for LGBTAmericans, WASH. POST: POSTPARTISAN (July 7,
2016), https-//www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/07/07/here-they-are-the-
enemies-of-equality-for-lgbt-americans [https-//perma.cc/UL73-38BB].
143. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 9 (tracing the emergence of religious liberties objections to same-
sex marriage). Sherif Girgis argues that critics of same-sex marriage are entitled to exemptions
from laws of general application to continue political conflict over same-sex marriage. See Sherif
Girgis, Nervous Victors, IlliberalMeasures:A Response to Douglas Nejaime and Reva Siegel, 125 YALE
L.J. FORUM 399 (2016). In the ordinary case, those who lose in litigation or legislation have the
usual forms of First Amendment rights to speak out and organize for change. As I understand his
argument, Girgis believes that religious objectors are, in addition, entitled to exemptions from the
application of laws with which they disagree-and may employ such exemptions to advocate for
the reversal of laws they oppose. That is, Girgis believes that religious objectors are entitled to tools
for expressing their opposition to laws that we do not grant to those who oppose laws on nonreligious
grounds. See id
144. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 9, at 2553 (observing that "when an existing legal regime is
successfully challenged so that its rules and reasons no longer seem persuasive or legitimate, defenders
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Kim Davis, the Kentucky clerk who invoked religious liberty as she refused
to officiate at same-sex marriages,' 45 richly illustrates how Americans drawing on
the role understandings of constitutional culture can protest judicial judgments.
The public debate provoked by Kim Davis's claims shows that Americans have
understandings about the ways citizens and officials must respect yet may properly
resistjudicial authority-and are prepared to argue with one another about it. For
example, after presidential candidate Mike Huckabee applauded Kim Davis by
asserting that she should only "obey [the law] if it's right,"" conservative Michael
Gerson attacked Huckabee for advocating that a public official defy the judgments
of the Supreme Court:
[T]here is no serious case to be made for the right of public officials to
break laws they don't agree with, even for religious reasons. This is, in
essence, seizing power from our system oflaws and courts. The proper
manner to change the law, in this instance, is to work for the election
of a president who will appoint Supreme Court justices with a different
view and for the election of senators who will confirm such justices.
Or to propose and pass a constitutional amendment. Davis may be
impatient with this system, but it is the one we have. Personally
assuming the role in Rowan County, Ky., of a Supreme Court majority
is not an option. The available alternatives are to implement the law
(as public servants across red America have overwhelmingly done) or
to resign in protest (as some have done as well).1 4 7
In the wake of Obergtfell, critics of the decision employed exactly the forms
of electoral recourse to which Gerson points. Even as many celebrated Obergefell
as the kind ofjudgment supported by popular opinion that courts have capacity to
render,148 critics of the decision mobilized to reassert control over the Court, in
may adopt new rules and reasons that preserve elements of the challenged regime" and analyzing
how this dynamic of "preservation through transformation" works in religious liberty-based objections
to same-sex marriage); id at 2552-54 (analyzing religious liberties claims in this framework). See
generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove"- Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE LJ.
2117, 2119 (1996) (analyzing the dynamic of preservation through transformation in the
modernization of marital status law).
145. Denniston, supra note 107.
146. Zach Carter, Mike Huckabee on Kim Davis: Obey the Law Only 7fIt's Right', HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 6, 2015, 12:28 PM), http-//www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mike-huckabee-kim-davis-
slavery..us_55ec61c4e4b03784e2761cb6 [https://perma.cc/LMP4-42QR].
147. Michael Gerson, Opinion, Kim Davis Is No Rosa Parks, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2015), https-//
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kim-davis-is-no-rosa-parks/2015/09/07/e821d528-533b-
11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_.story.htrmlkutm term=.0e58d93df766&awpisrc-nl_opinions8cwpm
m=1 [https//perma.cc/D6GD-T6E4. Gerson served in the administration of George W. Bush
and now writes for the Washington Post.
148. See supra note 74.
1761
1762 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728 (2017)
some regions as majorities and in other regions as intensely committed pluralities
of voters.149 Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump saw an opportunity to
court their votes and appealed to voters who were disaffected from the Court's
decision by selecting a prominent critic of same-sex marriage as his running
mate.so Trump appealed to those same voters when he announced a list of
conservative judges that he promised would guide his Supreme Court nomina-
tions.' After the election, President Trump asserted that voter concern about
the Court had been a significant factor in his election' 52 -- a judgment that exit
polls seemed to substantiate' 5 3-and moved to issue an executive order that
149. See supra note 81 (observing that Republican candidates for president appealed to voters who wanted
future nominees to the Court to oppose same-sex marriage).
150. See Paul Mirengoff, Conservatives Rally Around Mike Pencefor Vice President, POWERLINE (July 6,
2016), http-//www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2016/07/conservatives-rally-around-mike-pence-
for-vice-president.php [https-//perma.cc/N5V6-DWAZ] ("Pence is also popular with evangelicals.
He's strongly pro-life. With the support of evangelicals, the Koch brothers, and mainstream
conservatives like Joni Ernst, Pence seems like a logical selection, assuming Trump wants to shore
up conservative support.").
151. As journalist Adam Liptak noted:
Mr. Trump credited two leading conservative policy groups-the Heritage
Foundation and the Federalist Society-with helping to draw up his list. "You had
an awful lot of conservatives during the campaign who were incredibly skeptical, to
put it mildly, about Donald Trump," said John G. Malcolm, a Heritage Foundation
official who suggested a number of names that appeared on the list "But they certainly
cared a lot about the Scalia vacancy and the direction of the court. And that list was
a very, very sober list, and it was greatly reassuring."
Adam Liptak, Trump's Supreme Court List: Ivy League? Out. The Heartland? In., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2016), https-//www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-
justices.html [https-//penra.cc/RVA3-LJ2H]; see also Brooke Seipel, McConnel Supreme Court
Vacancy Helped Trump Win, HILL (April 8, 2017) http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/327964-mcconnell-takes-partial-credit-for-trumps-win-report [https://penna.cc/9T
86-TU24] ("Nobody was predicting Trump would get 90 percent of the Republican vote just like
Mitt Romney did, but he did. And the single biggest reason was, they wanted him to make the
Supreme Court appointment, not Hillary Clinton." (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell)).
152. Adam Liptak, Trump Promises Fast Action on Supreme Court Nomination, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/supreme-court-nomination-trump.html
[https*//perma.cc/J5VU-Y6PA] ("[Donald Trump] stressed the central role the court had played
in his campaign. 'I think it's one of the reasons I got elected,' Mr. Trump said. I think the people
of this country did not want to see what was happening with the Supreme Court, so I think it was a
very, very big decision as to why I was elected.').
153. See ABC News Analysis Desk & Paul Blake, Election 2016 National Exit Poll Results andAnalysis,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:10 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/election-2016-national-
exit-poll-results-analysis/storyid=43368675 [https//perma.cc/5DBW-DWAM] ("Nationally, 21
percent of voters call appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court'the most important factor' in their
decision, preliminary exit polls indicate. (Though President Obama did put forth a nominee, the
Supreme Court seat vacated when Justice Antonin Scalia passed away in Feburary [sic] remains
open.) These voters overwhelmingly favor Trump, 57 to 40 percent."); Exit Polls, CNN (Nov. 23,
2016, 11:58 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls [https//perma.cc/9Z7M-
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licenses religious exemptions from laws concerning same-sex marnage, contra-
ception, abortion, and more.15
CONCLUSION
We have traveled a long distance from the stories about law and conflict on
which accounts ofjudicial backlash rest. In familiar accounts of backlash, law has
authority insofar as it reflects social consensus; conflict begins when law diverges
from community and is a threat to each. In these accounts, there is little attention
to the changing understandings that conflict enables, or the social relationships
that constitutional conflict forges. In short, even as consensus-based models of
constitutionalism reason from legal realist premises, this mode of describing
our constitutional order fails to notice important features of our constitutional
order.
In fact, Americans intuitively understand the centrality of conflict in consti-
tutional law, even if they do not reason from this practical knowledge when
discussing backlash. Talk of backlash is widespread at least in part because, as I
will suggest in closing, claims about backlash are not only "sociological" or
descriptive; they are also legal and prescriptive, funding normative argument about
the roles of'judges. Talk about backlash employs the language of legal realism to
LH4T] (reporting that Supreme Court appointments were "important" for 70 percent of voters,
and that among those for whom it was the "most important" factor, a majority voted for Trump).
154. See Exec. Order No. 13798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21676 (May 4,2017). The Trump-Pence administration
is interested in accommodating religious objections to laws protecting same-sex marriage, premarital
sex, contraception, and abortion, as a leaked draft of an executive order illustrated. Sarah Posner,
Leaked Draft of Trump's Religious Freedom Order Reveals Sweeping Plans to Legalize Discrimination,
NATION (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/artide/1eaked-draft-of-trumps-religious-
freedom-order-reveals-sweeping-plans-to-legalize-discrimination [https-//perma.cc/4ZZU-Z6
AZ]. This regulation would allow any employer with moral or religious objections to his
employees using contraception to refuse to provide his employees health insurance benefits covering
contraception. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Trump and Pence Invoke Conscience to Block
Contraception, Contrary to Our Religious Liberty Tradition, TAKE CARE (June 4, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/trump-and-pence-invoke-conscience-to-block-contraception-
contrary-to-our-religious-liberty-tradition [https://perma.cc/35LY-M9WM]; Dylan Scott &
Sarah Kliff, Leaked Regulation: Trump Plans to Roll Back Obamacare Birth Control Mandate, VOX
(May 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/31/15716778/
trump-birth-control-regulation [https://perma.cc/HTJ3-YYUX].
On the rise of religious liberty arguments as a ground on which to limit Obergefell, see supra note
142. On the influence of the religious right in the Trump administration, see Michelle Goldberg,
Opinion, Donald Trump, the Religious Right's Trojan Horse, N.Y. TIMvES (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/opinion/sunday/donald-trump-the-religious-rights-troan
-horse.html?_r-0 ("It was the religious right's weakness, which meant it couldn't play kingmaker in
the primary, that made Mr. Trump's nomination possible, but his victory has given the movement
tremendous new power.").
1764 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728 (2017)
debate judicial roles in the era of the living Constitution. The entanglement of
description and prescription in backlash talk often goes unnoticed, compounding
the confusion.'s
As this reading of the backlash debate suggests, we rarely notice the role
understandings of constitutional culture or appreciate their importance in
sustaining our constitutional order. It is in the midst of fierce constitutional
conflict, when citizens or officials press at the outer limits of role authority,
that we focus on these often uncodified understandings about role whose centrality
in channeling conflict we most appreciate when they can no longer be taken
for granted. At these moments we often disagree about what counts as a
breach of role authority, and debates over this question figure prominently in
constitutional memory. Examples include the Court's decision in Lochner v. New
York,1s 6 President Roosevelt's proposal for Court-packing,s' the Court's deci-
sion in Brown v. Board ofEducation'5 and resistance to its enforcement,1 59 the
Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade 6 o or Bush v. Gore,161 and the Senate's refusal
155. Consider how the backlash claims of progressives and conservatives diverged as the debate over
marriage evolved. Over time, progressives have shifted from an argument about whether courts
could intervene on behalf of minority rights to claims about when and how courts should intervene
on behalf of minority rights. In invoking Roe, Justice Ginsburg was not warning judges to stay out
of the business of vindicating rights, but instead she was cautioning judges how best to intervene,
saying don't move too far, too fast. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. Conservatives,
by contrast, have invoked backlash as a reason for courts to stay out of the marriage debate and leave
resolution of the question to the political process. These various strands of backlash discourse are
often tangled together. In his Obergefell dissent, ChiefJustice Roberts cited Justice Ginsburg and
the abortion debate as a reason that the majority was wrong to recognize the constitutional rights of
same-sex couples to marry. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
Progressive and conservative claims on backlash illustrate a rich paradox: In the American
constitutional order, a claim about the institutional weakness of courts has developed into a form of
argument directing the exercise of judicial power. Once we appreciate that talk of backlash is
itself a mode of legal argument, we can better understand persistent recourse to talk of backlash
through the lens of constitutional culture, and we can do so in ways that help clarify our understanding
ofjudicial review.
156. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
157. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial
Separation ofPowers, 105 GEO. LJ. 255 (2017). Bradley and Siegel examine separation of powers
constraints on government actors. I include these among the role constraints of constitutional
culture, which as I describe also operate among citizens and officials.
158. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
159. For example, the Southern Manifesto challenged Brown as contrary to the Framers' intentions. See
102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956) (statement of Sen. George).
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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to confirm Judge Robert Borkl62 or to hold hearings for Judge Merrick
Garland.163
In some of these episodes, debate over whether the participants had
authority to act as they did has taken the form of a debate about constitutional
law. But in other of these episodes-particularly those that unfolded outside the
courts-we are not clear whether the role constraints in question are constraints
of law. Perhaps the asserted role constraints are merely political norms or
conventions,'" sub-constitutional understandings that have channeled conflict
for generations but may or may not have the status of law. 6 s This uncertainty is
especially acute in contexts where courts do not commonly intervene. What exactly
are the role constraints, if any? Are they constraints of law? If they do not have
the force of constitutional law, are they constraints at all?'
162. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA (2d ed. 2007).
163. See BREST, LEVINSON, BALKIN, AMAR & SIEGEL, 2016 SUPPLEMENT: PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUDONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIAL 44-52 (2016).
164. Cf Bradley & Siegel, supra note 157 (exploring separation of powers constraints on governmental
actors, such as norms constraining court packing that we might understand either as "historical
gloss" on constitutional text or as "constitutional conventions").
165. The boundary is endlessly negotiated. For one closely argued account, see id. at 316-19. For
another example, consider Robert George's admiring review of Akhil Amar's America's Unwritten
Constitution. See Robert P. George, Interpretive Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012),
http//www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/books/review/americas-unwritten-constitution-by-akhil-
reed-amar.html [https//perma.cc/U3BW-FT9H] (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
UNWRTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012))
("The tough question is how to determine systematically and rigorously what falls within the
'unwritten constitution.' What is the text, understood in context, pointing to? Amar proposes several
criteria for deciding, which become more controversial as the book goes on.").
166. This uncertainty is richly illustrated in debates over the Senate's refusal to hold hearings on Judge
Garland's confirmation. See BREST, LEVINSON, BALKIN, AMAR & SIEGEL, supra note 163, at
48-49. Critics of the Senate's action do not share a framework in which to condemn its decision. For
example:
I agree with the argument that there was nothing "unconstitutional," in the
standard lawyer's sense of that term, in the GOP refusing to give Garland a
hearing, given the necessary agreement that they could have voted against him
after hearings on whatever grounds they wanted. Nor am I willing to argue
that giving nominees hearings is part of Akhil Amar's "unwritten Constitu-
tion" that is sufficiently discernable to allow us confidently to proclaim what is
or is not "constitutional." What I am willing to say is that the GOP breached
the long-standing rule of comity, similar, say, to not blocking the ordinary op-
erations of the Senate by refusing to give unanimous consent or waiving the
reading of the Congressional Record, etc.. .. In any event, this is what Mark
Tushnet means, I believe-he can correct me if I'm wrong-by talking about
"constitutional hardball." No functioning constitutional order can survive if
everyone is playing such hardball.
Posting of Sanford Levinson, to conlawprof@lists.uda.edu (Feb. 1, 2017) (on file
with author).
What is crucial to appreciate is the centrality of these debates about role to
the functioning of the constitutional order. It is not conflict as such that poses a
threat to the constitutional order. As I show, conflict as well as consent sustain
the Constitution's meaning and authority. Conflict over the Constitution has
engendered and transformed our understanding of constitutional decisions we
deem canonical. Conflict over the Constitution sustains the allegiance of those
most estranged from the Court's judgments. On the other hand, conflict uncon-
strained by the role understandings of constitutional culture does pose a grave
threat to the constitutional order. Institutions cannot function if individuals inside
and outside of them do not have shared understandings about role, however
contested the particulars may be.
Constitutional conflict is quite commonly marked by claims that some official
is exercising authority illegitimately.6' As I have observed, negotiations over role
authority is an integral feature of constitutional conflict.' Yet, at times, anxiety
that government officials have wholly abandoned constraints on role is especially
acute.
Anxiety that the role constraints that channel constitutional conflict are
breaking down has suffused the recent election and the new administration of
Donald Trump. Numerous commentators worry about a breakdown in norms.'69
167. See supra notes 156-163 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
169. Many commentators have focused on the norm-transgressing features of the 2016 election. See,
e.g., Alexander Burns, Donald Trump's Defance Is Seen as 'Colossal Mistake' That Threatens U S. Image,
N.Y. TIIES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/us/politics/donald-trump-
election-rigging.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/STGU-A63U] ("It is unclear whether Mr. Trump
has a concrete plan to contest the results of the election if he loses. There is no law that forces a losing
candidate to concede defeat-only a bipartisan tradition of comity."). As one reporter has noted:
Trump's starding refusal to promise he'd accept the election results was just the latest
in a series of seemingly casual dismissals of long-held American political norms.
Trump has suggested widening libel laws in a way that would blatantly infringe the
freedom of the press; he's also flouted the First Amendment in his vow to ban
Muslim immigrants and to dose down mosques. Meanwhile, his threat to jail his
opponent if elected has raised the specter that he might use his office to quell
legitimate dissent.
Yascha Mounk, Yes, American Democracy Could Break Down, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 2016),
http//www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/trump-american-democracy-could-break-
down-214383 [https://perma.cc/6D3F-C6S2]; see also Clare Foran, An Erosion of Democratic
Norms inAmerica'' The President-ElectIs Testing the Limits ofPolitical Convention, ATLANTIC (Nov.
22, 2016), https//www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/donald-trump-democratic-
norms/508469 [https-//perma.cc/G2E2-7RSH] (featuring an interview with Dartmouth College
political scientist Brendan Nyhan on how Trump's actions frequently breach norms); Greg Sargent,
Opinion, A Group ofPolitical Scientists Says Trump's Attacks on Our Democracy Are Unprecedented and
Dangerous, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/11/07/a-group-of-political-scientists-says-trumps-attacks-on-our-
democracy-are-unprecedented-and-dangerous [https://perma.cc/R9M6-GW3S] (discussing
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Responding to a president who has challenged the legitimacy of elections7 e and
the authority of ("so-called") judges,"' one observer announced that "norms and
practices that underpin our constitutional order are under threat." He continued:
I'm not talking about whether abortion will be legal or about what
immigration policy will be (as important as these issues are to a great
many people, of all political stripes). I'm talking about whether the
outcomes of elections will be respected, about whether judicial orders
will be obeyed. You know-fimdamentals.1 7 '
The President's desire for a "Muslim Ban,"'73 attacks on the "FAKE
NEWS media" as "the enemy of the American People!"'74 and abrupt firing of
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who was investigating his
administration1 75 prompt similar anxieties. Considering developments such as
political scientists' documentation of Trump's unprecedented challenges to election norms); infra
note 175 (quoting sources discussing President Trump's firing of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
170. In the dosing weeks of his campaign, Donald Trump regularly asserted that the election is "rigged"
and that his opponent Hillary Clinton should be in jail. David Jackson, Trump: Clinton Should Be
in JaiZ the Election Is Rigged, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2016, 3:58 PM), http-//www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/10/15/donald-trump-maine-new-hampshire/92143964
[https-//perma.cc/MG3B-S7NQ; see also Philip Bump, Americans Now Live in Two Worlds, Each
With Its Own Reality, WASH. POST: THE Fix (Oct. 15,2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/15/americans-now-live-in-two-worlds-each-with-its-own-reality
[https-//perma.cc/6J8C-3G59] (discussing claims of election rigging and the trust issues they tap
and fuel). His supporters chanted "lock her up!" Jackson, supra. Since taking office, President
Trump has continued to argue that the popular vote count for Hillary Clinton was contaminated
by millions of fraudulent votes. See, e.g., Paulina Firozi, Trump Continues to Insist Voter Fraud
Robbed Him of Popular Vote, HILL (Jan. 23, 2017, 8:12 PM), http://thehillcom/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/315786-trump-continues-to-insist-mass-voter-fraud-robbed-him-of
[https://perma.cc/W7XD-5HR4].
171. President Trump greeted the decision of a federal judge temporarily staying enforcement of his
executive order with the tweet, "The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-
enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overtumed!" Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITER (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/827867311054974976 [https://perma.cc/D7SW-WW35].
172. Posting of Mitch Berman, to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu (Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with author). For
similar observations, see supra note 169.
173. Amy B. Wang, Trump Askedfor a Muslim Ban,' Giuliani Says-and Ordered a Commission to Do It
Legally', WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 29, 2017), https-//www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-
do-it-legally/?utmterm=.bcb2f04al8e4 [https//perma.cc/CJF3-L885].
174. See DonaldJ. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITER (Feb. 17,2017, 1:48 PM), https.//twitter.
com/realDonaldTrump/status/832708293516632065?ref src=twsrc%5Etfw [https-//perma.cc/
V889-X76S].
175. See Michael Gerson, The Real Test of Our Tolerance of Trump Comes Now, WASH. POST (May 11,
2017, 7:57 PM), httpsi//www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-real-test-of-our-tolerance-for-
trup-comes-now/2017/05/11/d9558c6a-3679-11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html?tid=ss
mail&utmterm=.ale01d7a6bl2 [https://perma.cc/347Q-MK9W] ("It is dangerous to have a
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these, one account concludes: Whether American liberal democracy "survives
depends less on the robustness of our formal, institutional defenses-which, we
conclude, are not particularly strong-but on the decisions of discrete political
elites, and the contingent and elusive dynamics of popular and elite mobilization
for and against the conventions and norms that render democratic life feasible."M76
These accounts point to the domain of constitutional culture that this Article
describes: to popular and professional understandings about law in the United
States that structure the roles of citizens and officials in making claims in conflicts
over the Constitution's meaning. These understandings about role, and the
beliefs about institutional authority on which they rest, help citizens and officials
decide whether they must defer to one another, and when and how they may
contest each other's views. It is through these role-based understandings that the
constitutional order coordinates its potentially conflicting commitments to
democratic responsiveness and to the rule of law.
The role constraints of constitutional culture seek to channel disagreement
into nonviolent forms.m' Threats of violence of the sort that have surfaced in the
leader with disdain for the law. It is also dangerous to have a leader who believes that anything legal
is permissible. Trump's firing of Comey was legal. It also violated a democratic norm-a proper
presidential deference for an ongoing investigation and the independence of law enforcement.");
Amanda Taub, Comey's Firing Tests Strength of the 'Guardrails of Democracy', N.Y. TIMES: THE
UPSHOT (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/upshot/comeys-fring-tests-
strength-of-the-guardrails-of-democracy.html (interviewing political scientists about the firing of
James Comey and observing that "[i]n unhealthy systems, norm violations can spiral into tit-for-tat
retaliation, ultimately tearing democracies apart. But in strong democracies, institutions will step in
to enforce vital norms, preventing escalation and protecting the democratic system").
176. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (updated manuscript at 100).
177. Role understandings of the constitutional order restrict the exercise of violence to state actors who
act under Due Process constraints, and require citizens to achieve change through persuasion rather
than coercion (allowing for liminal cases where violence serves a communicative rather than a coercive
role). See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1352 ("The consent condition requires those who disagree about
questions of constitutional meaning to advance their views through persuasion, by appeal to the
Constitution. It is a constraint on argument that shapes the roles of citizens and officials in a.
constitutional democracy, and enacts community bound by conviction rather than coercion.").
These constitutional constraints exist in principle but not always in practice: they offer a framework
for arguing about the legitimate bounds of public and private power. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado,
From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People. The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 127 (2017) (analyzing "an important dimension of the police violence
problem: Fourth Amendment law. It permits police officers to force interactions with African
Americans with little or no basis" and showing how "[t]his 'front-end' police contact-
which Fourth Amendment law enables-is often the predicate to'back-end' police violence-which
Fourth Amendment law should help to prevent"); qc Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE LJ. 1601, 1601 (1986) ("Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions maybe
properly understood apart from one another.").
American electorate... are a vivid reminder that democracies depend on
understandings of role to channel conflict and transform potentially antagonistic
relations into agonistic relations.'79 When these understandings about role break
down, agonistic relations deteriorate into utter mistrust and enmity. Citizens
assert authority through violenceso and officials subvert democratic norms and
processes for entrenching power.'
We commonly talk as if consent and consensus define the terms and bonds
of community, but the Constitution's authority does not depend on consent
alone. Conflict channeled through the role understandings of constitutional
culture is crucial in directing the growth and sustaining the authority of our
constitutional law. Conflict helped forge Obergefell v. Hodges and establish its
authority, just as conflict will play a crucial role in defining its reach. For conflict
to serve these ends, however, it must be constrained. Whether we ground these
constraints in text, structure, or the unwritten Constitution, or call these constraints
law, gloss, norms, or conventions, the vitality of these role constraints is key to the
strength and to the character of a constitutional democracy.
178. See, e.g., Lois Beckett, Milwaukee Sheriff Says It's Titchforks and Torches Time' and Stands by Trump,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2016, 4:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/15/
milwaukee-sheriff-david-clarke-pitchforks-torches-time-twitter [https-//perma.cc/4Y3P-NE4T]
(quoting Sheriff David A. Clarke, Jr., of Milwaukee County, who previously called Black Lives
Matter the "enemy," asserting that "[i]t's incredible that our institutions of gov, WH, Congress,
DOJ, and big media are corrupt & all we do is bitch. Pitchforks and torches time").
179. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., supra note 178.
181. Cf Huq &Ginsburg, supra note 176 (updated manuscript at 97) (discussing role understandings of
officials who are committed to democratic politics, rather than to the securing of
permanent, entrenched governmental power").
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